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Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, defines the primary objective of Hungary’s central bank 
as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function 
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical 
fluctuations in output and employment. 
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by 
ensuring an inflation rate near the 3 per cent medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the 
supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the 
expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the monetary conditions 
consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful 
consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic 
developments, the inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability. 
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance 
transparency, the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy 
decisions. The Report presents the inflation forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic 
Analysis, Financial Analysis and Financial Stability departments, as well as the macroeconomic 
developments underlying these forecasts. The Report is published quarterly. The forecasts of the 
Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis departments are based on assumption 
of endogenous monetary policy. In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the 
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Governor. 
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THE STATEMENT OF THE MONETARY COUNCIL ABOUT THE 
OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MONETARY POLICY 
ASSESSMENT 
Monetary policy over the past quarter 
In the period from September to November, the Monetary Council reduced the central bank base rate in 
three successive steps, by a total of 75 basis points. The Council’s decisions reflected the view that, 
looking forward, weak domestic demand would have a substantial disinflationary impact on the economy, 
which would increasingly dominate inflation developments as the cost shocks keeping inflation high in 
the short term dissipated, thereby helping to meet the Bank’s inflation target. Global risk appetite 
increased significantly during this period, contributing to a marked decline in Hungarian risk premia and 
opening up additional room for manoeuvre in monetary policy. 
In its November press release, the Monetary Council indicated that it would consider a further reduction 
in interest rates if the improvement in financial market sentiment continued and the medium-term 
outlook for inflation was consistent with the Bank’s 3 per cent target. 
Macroeconomic developments and outlook 
Over the past quarter, the international environment was marked by strongly divergent trends. Financial 
market sentiment improved, while the euro-area economy fell back into recession this year and the 
outlook for global activity deteriorated. Official announcements on the ongoing crisis management 
efforts in Europe and further quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve both contributed to the 
increase in investor risk appetite. The Monetary Council expects that the measures taken by European 
countries to help manage the crisis in the euro area will live up to the expectations and that activity on 
the Continent will recover gradually over the next two years. 
Turning to developments in the domestic economy, there has also been a contrast between improving 
perceptions of risk and subdued real activity. Output continued to fall in the second and third quarters, 
though less so than in the first quarter. Domestic and external factors both contributed to the decline in 
GDP. While the slowdown in external markets continues to hinder Hungarian export growth, actions to 
reduce private and public debts accumulated in the period prior to the financial crisis, tight credit 
conditions and the uncertain business environment act as a persistent drag on domestic demand. 
Meanwhile, risk premia on Hungarian assets fell sharply amid signs of increasing global risk appetite. 
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, the outlook for economic growth has deteriorated recently and 
output is likely to grow only modestly over the next two years. Exports are expected to remain the 
primary source of growth even as external demand continues to soften, while domestic demand will 
remain weak. Domestic balance-sheet deleveraging will continue, with consumption and investment 
likely to fall further, mainly due to tight credit conditions and the uncertain business environment, 
followed by a gradual recovery from 2014. The potential output of the Hungarian economy is likely to 
increase very modestly over the next two years, reflecting the sustained weakness in investment and 
persistently high unemployment. 
Labour market activity has strengthened gradually in recent years, but companies have limited ability to 
absorb the excess supply of labour from the market in a weak demand environment. The rate of earnings 
growth has picked up sharply this year, with the administrative measures at the start of the year playing 
a major role. The introduction of the wage compensation scheme for companies cushioned the upward 
impact of high earnings growth on costs. Nevertheless, unit labour costs increased, leading to a 
deterioration in corporate profitability. 
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In the Council’s judgement, the rise in unemployment in recent years partly reflects permanent 
structural problems, but the labour market is likely to remain loose in the period ahead, even taking 
account of this factor. In addition to the weak outlook for growth and companies’ poor profitability, the 
increases in the minimum wage and the guaranteed minimum wage for skilled workers are also impeding 
a recovery in employment, which is only likely to start in the private sector in 2014. Although the job 
protection scheme to be launched next year is expected to lower the costs of employing labour under 
the programme, the Government’s measures, which result in a deterioration in private sector 
profitability, suggest that companies will continue to adjust going forward. 
The consumer price index has remained persistently above the inflation target this year, despite the 
recessionary environment. The high rate of inflation mainly reflects the effects of the commodity price 
shocks and the Government’s indirect tax increases, while the pace of underlying inflation remains 
moderate. Looking ahead, inflation is expected to slow significantly in the short term, mainly reflecting 
movements in items excluded from the core measure. In the medium term, however, the burden placed 
on companies by the administrative measures and the minimum wage increase will strengthen the pass-
through of higher costs to prices, which in turn may generate cost-push inflationary pressure along the 
entire production chain. 
In terms of the outlook for inflation, there is significant uncertainty about the extent and timing of the 
pass-through of higher corporate costs to prices in the wake of those measures and the ability of weak 
domestic demand to offset this. 
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, Hungary’s net external financing capacity is likely to rise further in 
the coming years. This improvement in the economy’s external position will reflect the steady increase 
in the surplus on goods and services and higher inflows of EU transfers. However, the negative income 
balance is likely to deteriorate further. 
In 2012 and 2013, the fiscal deficit is expected to be broadly consistent with the Government’s target. 
The measures announced in recent months are likely to lead to a significant improvement in the fiscal 
balance in 2013. There is considerable uncertainty about the expected size of deficit in 2014. The 
Government’s commitment to maintaining a low fiscal deficit path may contribute to long-term fiscal 
sustainability, but the slowdown in potential growth may have the opposite effect. 
Maintaining its earlier position, the Council continues to consider it crucial that an agreement between 
the Government and the European Union and International Monetary Fund be reached, as this would 
contribute to a sustained improvement in risk perceptions and a decline in yields as well as to the 
sustainability of government debt and would help support lending activity and improve the investment 
climate. 
Monetary policy considerations 
The macroeconomic outlook is surrounded by a considerable degree of uncertainty. With a negative 
output gap and inflation remaining at high levels, the latest government measures will raise companies’ 
production costs. One key issue in terms of the medium-term inflation outlook relevant for monetary 
policy is the ability of the corporate sector to adjust to the increase in production costs against the 
backdrop of a weaker outlook for growth. 
The sustained decline in profitability may prompt companies to cut back further on investment 
expenditure, which in turn may lead to a slowdown in potential output growth. In the short run, given 
the amount of capital available to them, companies may choose to restore profitability by improving 
productivity and reducing wage costs. Furthermore, they may attempt to pass on increased costs into 
prices, which in turn may imply higher consumer prices. The relative strength of these adjustment 
channels depends on the extent to which the availability of unused capacity is able to exert discipline on 
price and wage-setting and inflation expectations are well-anchored. The aim of monetary policy is to 
ensure that this adjustment takes place against the background of moderate wage and price dynamics, in 
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order to make it possible to meet the 3 per cent inflation target in the medium term. The Monetary 
Council will closely monitor developments in tax-adjusted inflation. 
In the Monetary Council’s judgement, the potential growth rate of the Hungarian economy has fallen 
significantly recently, reflecting the postponement of investment decisions and financing constraints on 
companies; there is, however, considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of the reduction in 
productive capacity available to businesses. If the supply side of the economy has been damaged only to 
a smaller extent, companies will have less room to pass on increased costs into prices, due to the 
stronger disinflationary impact of unused capacities. All this may result in more moderate inflation in the 
medium term, which is more consistent with a looser monetary policy. By contrast, if companies expect 
the high inflation environment of recent years to persist, the passing on of cost pressures to prices may 
be stronger. At the same time, economic agents’ higher inflation expectations may also affect wage-
setting, in addition to price-setting decisions, which in turn would impede the recovery in profitability in 
the medium term and would merely lead to a higher nominal path. Corporate adjustment through higher 
price and wage dynamics can be prevented by tightening monetary policy. 
The room for manoeuvre in monetary policy is materially influenced by perceptions of the risks 
associated with the economy, which have fallen significantly in recent months, mainly reflecting global 
factors. Looking ahead, the Council judges that there are both upside and downside risks to changes in 
risk perceptions. The contrast between weak global economic activity and strong risk appetite in 
international financial markets warrants a cautious monetary policy stance. At the same time, progress 
with the institutional reforms in the euro area, the reduction in fiscal risks in the US as well as 
expectations related to the success of domestic fiscal consolidation may increase the room for interest 
rate policy manoeuvre in Hungary. 
In the Council’s assessment, the high level of excess capacity in the economy offsets medium-term 
inflationary risks. This is supported by the fact that underlying inflation remains moderate and inflation 
is kept high by transient factors. In the weak demand environment, the corporate sector can adjust to 
the upward effects of the Government measures on costs only through moderate price increases. Given 
the slack conditions in the labour market, the rate of earnings growth is likely to slow as the effects of 
administrative measures fade. Taking these factors into account, the inflation target can be met even if 
monetary conditions are eased. The Council will consider a further reduction in interest rates only if the 
improvement in financial market sentiment continues and incoming data confirm that the inflation target 
is achievable on the horizon relevant for monetary policy. 
  
  6/69 
 
SUMMARY TABLE OF BASELINE SCENARIO 
(our forecast is based on endogenous monetary policy) 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014
Fact Projection
Inlation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2,7 5,1 5,2 3,7
Core inflation without indirect tax effects 2,5 2,5 3,5 3,4
Consumer price index 3,9 5,7 3,5 3,2
Economic growth
External demand (GDP based)2 2,7 0,7 0,8 2,1
Household consumption expenditure 0,5 -1,7 -0,2 0,6
Gross fixed capital formation -3,6 -5,1 -0,2 -1,0
Domestic absorption 0,1 -3,8 -0,8 0,2
Export 6,3 2,2 2,4 4,8
Import 5,0 -0,1 1,2 3,8
GDP3 1,6 -1,4 0,5 1,5
External balance
Current account balance 0,9 2,0 3,7 4,3
External financing capacity 3,3 4,3 6,8 6,9
Government balance4
ESA balance 4,2 -3,7 (-2,7) -4,4 (-3.0) -5,2 (-3,8)
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings5,8 5,0 4,6 3,6 6,1
Whole-economy employment6 0,8 1,8 0,3 0,5
Private sector gross average earnings7 5,4 7,0 4,9 3,0
Private sector employment6 1,4 1,4 -0,3 0,4
Unit labour costs in the private sector6,8 5,3 7,6 2,8 1,5
Household real income9 2,3 -4,2 0,2 0,3
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 The forecast for 2012 contains calendar effect.
4 As a percentage of GDP supposing the full cancellation of free central reserves.
5 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
6 December: according to the CSO LFS data, September: according to the CSO LFS data corrected by fostered workers.
7 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
8 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
9 MNB estimate.
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1 INFLATION AND REAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK 
The staff forecast is founded on an endogenous interest rate path and is based on the Monetary Policy 
Model developed by the MNB.1 In this model, monetary policy reactions are mainly influenced by the 
expected deviations in inflation from the medium-term inflation target over the time horizon relevant 
for monetary policy and by our picture of the cyclical position of the economy. Staff have calibrated the 
sensitivity of the reaction function to individual variables on the basis of past decisions of the Monetary 
Council and international experience. The forecasts of the staff are based on assumptions in a number 
of areas. Considering that the assumptions applied involve a high degree of uncertainty, the Council 
also takes into account further information, in addition to the results of the model. Accordingly, while 
the interest rate path implied by the model may provide valuable information for the decisions of the 
Monetary Council, it does not necessarily coincide with the decisions of the Council at all times. 
The Hungarian economy continues to be characterised by weak activity. The latest macroeconomic data 
shows that domestic demand continues to be subdued, while the economic performance of Hungary’s 
export markets is also declining. The economy has considerable excess capacity and the output gap is 
negative. Indirect tax and commodity price increases have kept inflation above the 3 per cent target 
this year, in spite of the disinflationary effect of weak demand. Employment continued to expand 
despite the recessionary environment, while administrative measures lead to generally high wage 
dynamics. The increase in unit labour cost, rising commodity prices and the taxes burdening certain 
sectors resulted in a deterioration in corporate profitability. 
The recently announced government measures ensure the achievement of the 2013 fiscal deficit target, 
mainly through a sustained increase in the tax burden on the private sector. Administrative wage 
increases that exceed growth in productivity may also result in an increase in firms’ production costs. 
Accordingly, our forecast is determined by the weakening business conditions and the adjustment of 
companies to government measures. The cost-increasing effect of the measures that affect specific 
sectors are fed into the corporate sector as a whole through the partial pass-through of the burdens. 
Companies may react to the further weakening in the income position partly through restraining 
employment and wages and partly by raising their sales prices. In the weak demand environment, pass-
through into consumer prices may remain gradual, but over the forecast horizon the cost pressure may 
result in wide-ranging price increases in the consumer basket. On the one hand, the deteriorating 
profitability due to cut-backs in investment results in a further decline in domestic demand, and on the 
other hand, due to its unfavourable effect on production capacities, it also reduces the potential 
growth rate. The reduction of wage costs may primarily be reflected in lower wage increases of 
employees not affected by the minimum wage increase and restraint in regular non-wage benefits. 
Despite the weak demand conditions the purchasing power of households will increase in 2013 with 
government measures playing a major role. However, the uncertain economic environment, persistently 
weak lending activity and the continued reduction of the debt accumulated prior to the crisis will 
moderate domestic demand for years, while only a slow pick-up is expected in Hungary’s external 
markets. In line with the above, following this year’s downturn, only moderate economic growth is 
expected over the forecast horizon. Output will remain below its potential level throughout the period. 
The decrease in household energy prices will significantly reduce consumer price inflation in the short 
run. However, the rise in the production costs of firms will gradually increase underlying inflation from 
middle of next year. Following partial pass-through of the increased costs, the effect of the negative 
output gap will prevail, thus the inflation target can be achieved in the second half of 2014.  
                                                 
1 For more details on the model, see Chapter 6.1 of the March 2011 issue of the Quarterly Report on 
Inflation and the following study: Ágnes Horváth, Csaba Köber and Katalin Szilágyi: MPM – The Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank’s monetary policy model (MNB Bulletin, June 2011). 
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The macroeconomic factors that determine the interest rate path consistent with the baseline forecast 
continue to point in opposite directions. The negative output gap in itself, would justify a looser 
monetary policy stance. The increase in production costs of the corporate sector works against the  
disinflationary effect of the negative output gap. In the baseline scenario of the forecast, we assume 
that – despite the weak demand conditions – firms adjust partly through their pricing –, which leads to 
inflation pressures. However the size and the time-profile of the pass-through of cost increases are 
surrounded by significant uncertainty. Looking at the first half of the horizon in our baseline forecast, 
the factors pointing in the direction of tightening and easing broadly cancel each other out. Room for 
decreasing the interest rate will be available when cost push inflation dissipates. 
 
1.1 Inflation forecast 
Inflation may decline considerably over the short run, due mainly to the announced reduction of 
regulated prices. Core inflation, however, may gradually rise in the medium term, as the considerable 
increase in the corporate tax burden – feeding through the production chain – may result in elevated 
inflationary pressure in an increasingly large part of the consumer basket. With cost pressure appearing 
in the medium term and the price-reducing effect of weak demand prevailing over the entire forecast 
horizon, the inflation target can be achieved in the second half of 2014. 
 
Chart 1-1 : Fan chart of the inflation forecast 
 
 
Chart 1-2 CPI forecast
 
 
Our inflation forecast is determined by the feed-
through of the effect of cost shocks, the 
production cost-increasing effect of government 
tax measures and the output gap, which is 
negative over the entire forecast horizon. 
Compared to the September forecast, we expect 
considerably lower inflation over the short run (for 
details see Box 1-1). Although medium-term 
inflationary pressure strengthened due to the 
increase in production costs, inflation may remain 
close to the 3 per cent target over 2013 as well, 
thanks to steadily more favourable developments 
in non-core inflation items, mainly as a result of 
government measures (Chart 1-1). 
Developments in the prices of non-core inflation 
items are lower over the entire forecast horizon 
compared to our September forecast. Most of the 
recent increase in agricultural commodity prices 
has already appeared in the inflation of 
unprocessed food, and thus no further price 
increases are expected in this product group. With 
the appearance of the new harvest, prices may 
even reflect some correction in the second half of 
2013. Mainly as a result of the appreciation of the 
forint vis-a-vis the US dollar, oil prices have 
declined since September, a trend which may 
continue in the coming years on the basis of 
futures prices. In line with the government’s 
announcements, a 10 per cent reduction may take 
place in the prices of gas, electricity and district 




Chart 1-3  Decomposition of the inflation forecast 





Table 1-1  Details of the inflation forecast 
 
 
heating for households as of January 2013, 
considerably reducing the overall consumer price 
index as well (Chart 1-2). 
The pricing of processed goods and services is 
determined by the feed-through of the high 
agricultural commodity prices and the production 
cost-increasing effects of government measures. 
The feed-through effect of high agricultural 
commodity prices has already been reflected in 
processed food prices in recent months. These 
developments may continue at the beginning of 
next year as well. According to the adopted 
budget, the tax burden on companies may increase 
permanently. The increasing tax burden on 
specific sectors results in a rise in costs in an 
increasingly broad part of the production chain. 
According to our forecast, over the short run, 
companies will react to the deterioration in 
profitability stemming from the elevated costs 
mainly by restraining wages and to some extent 
the number of employees. In the medium term, 
however, in parallel with an upturn in demand, 
the effect of shifting a part of the cost increase 
will also appear in an increase in consumer prices. 
The output gap, although closing gradually, will 
remain negative over the entire forecast horizon, 
and therefore the price-restraining effect of weak 
demand will prevail over the entire period. Core 
inflation, however, will still remain high, and 
inflation will decline only slowly in the medium 
term (Chart 1-3). 
As a result of all of these factors, inflation is 
forecast to be somewhat above the 3 per cent 
target both this year and next year. With the 
interest rate path assumed in the forecast, the 
inflation target may be achieved in the second half 
of 2014 (Table 1-1). The factors behind the change 
in our 2013 inflation forecast are explained in 
detail in Box 1-1. 
 
Box 1-1 Key important reasons for the change in our 2013 inflation forecast 
In our current inflation forecast, we project a 3.5 per cent rate of inflation for 2013, while in September 
we expected a considerably higher inflation of 5.0 per cent. The unusual size of this revision results from 
several factors, with factors exogenous in terms of the forecast playing the leading role. 
 The most important factor is the Government’s announcement that regulated energy prices (gas, 
electricity, district heating) will decline by 10 per cent as of 1 January. Taking into account the 
significant weight of the items concerned, this measure reduces our inflation forecast by more 
than 1 percentage point. 
2011 2012 2013 2014
2,7 5,1 5,2 3,7
Unprocessed food 4,3 6,8 5,9 4,0
Gasoline and market energy 13,8 11,9 0,2 1,3
Regulated prices 4,0 4,7 -1,0 2,3
Total 6,4 6,8 0,4 2,3
3,9 5,7 3,5 3,2Consumer price index
Core inflation
Non-core inflation
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 In addition to the above measure, the change in the excise tax regulations also plays an important 
role. Our September forecast was based on the assumption that – in accordance with the bill 
submitted as a proposal by the Government in July – significant alcohol and tobacco excise tax 
increases would take place in January and May 2013 (see Table 1-2). In October, the National 
Assembly amended the bill, and then adopted its amended version. Under the amendment, the 
excise tax on tobacco products increased to a much lesser extent, and the measure entered into 
effect in one step, in December 2012. No amendment took place in the case of alcohol products. 
The change in the magnitude of the excise tax increase in the indirect tax measures that affect 
inflation justified a 0.4 percentage point lower impact on the overall consumer price index. 
 Another factor behind the change in our forecast is that, in our current opinion, the reduction of 
pharmaceutical price subsidies may increase consumer prices to a lesser extent. This alteration is 
justified by price data received since September, the results of blind biddings and a HUF 60 billion 
expansion of the pharmaceutical budget compared to the original plans. 
 Finally, incoming inflation figures and the oil price expressed in forint terms were also lower than 
our expectations. The lower inflation data may partly be attributable to temporary effects, but we 
consider a part of this surprise to be long-lasting. This also moved our inflation forecast for next 
year downwards. 
 As opposed to these inflation-reducing – mostly – exogenous effects, the increase in corporate 
production costs may result in a strengthening of inflationary pressure. Actual measures announced 
by the government have an impact mainly on corporate costs and have stronger price increasing 
effects compared to the hypothetical fiscal measures assumed in our September Report. However 
these cost-increasing effects can only feed through into consumer prices gradually, and thus over 
the short run it can weaken the significant disinflationary effects only to a lesser extent. 
 









Name of taxable product 
and type of tax
Since July 2012 Since January 2013 Since May 2013







Total tax increae 
(Dec.+Jan., per 
cent)
spirits, specific tax 289 900 333 385 15 333 385 15
aromatic spirits, specific 
tax 414 150 476 270 15 476 270 15
beer, specific tax 1 470 1 620 10 1 620 10
champagne, specific tax 14 960 16 460 10 16 460 10
other alcoholic drinks, 
specific tax 23 200 25 520 10 25 520 10
tobacco, specific tax 11 900 13 700 15 500 30 12 500 5
tobacco, minimum tax 22 300 25 800 29 300 31 24 920 12
fine-cut tobacco, 
minimum tax 11 150 14 650 18 150 63 12 460 12
other cut tobacco, 
minimum tax 11 150 14 650 18 150 63 12 460 12
Proposal of the Minister for National Economy (10 July 2012, 
T/7953)
Law 2012 CLIV, 2.§-8.§ (passed on 15 Oct. 2012, 
proclaimed on 25 Oct.)
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1.2 Real economy outlook 
According to our forecast, the output of the Hungarian economy will decline this year and will probably 
grow only slowly in 2013 as well. Growth continues to be driven by net exports, but the expansion in 
exports is expected to be slower than in the past, due to the generally deteriorating outlook for 
international economic activity. Domestic demand remains persistently weak. Consumption and 
investment may continue to decline both this year and next year as a result of domestic agents’ 
protracted balance-sheet adjustments, tight lending conditions and the uncertain economic 
environment. The increase in the tax burden on the private sector also points to a decline in 
investment. With unemployment remaining at a high level and investment activity persistently slack, 
potential economic growth may also remain subdued for a prolonged period. 
 
 
Chart 1-5 Fan chart of the GDP forecast 
 
 







Over the past three quarters, GDP has declined. 
This recession is explained by a simultaneous 
contraction in external and domestic demand. In 
both Hungary and its export markets, weak 
demand is mainly attributable to fiscal balance-
improving measures, tight lending conditions and 
the uncertainty related to medium-term 
prospects. More robust growth in Hungary’s export 
markets is only expected to be seen in 2014, 
whereas lending conditions may remain tight over 
the entire forecast horizon. 
In line with developments in global economic 
activity, export growth is only likely to pick up in 
2013. There has been no significant expansion in 
the market share of Hungarian exports in recent 
years. Looking ahead, even with the new 
automotive industry capacities, only a slight 
increase in export market share is expected (for 
more details, see Box 3-1 (Chart 1-6)). 
Tight conditions continue to prevail in lending. 
Compared to our September forecast, the increase 
in the magnitude of the transaction tax and the 
switch to a permanent bank tax significantly 
impairs the expected lending activity of the 
financial intermediary system. As a result of all 
this, we have carried out a downward revision of 
our forecast scenario in both the corporate and 
household segments; we still do not expect any 
pick-up in lending over the forecast horizon (Chart 
1-7). 
Consumption will decrease this year, as a result of 
a decline in the real value of earnings and 
financial transfers, the continued balance sheet 
adjustment and tight lending conditions. Real 
income of households, however, will increase 
again next year, which is attributable to the joint 
effect of several factors. Fiscal adjustment 
measures only have a moderate direct impact on 
households’ incomes, while their purchasing power 
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Chart 1-7 Our forecast for household and 
corpoarte lending (2003 Q1 - 2014 Q4) 
 
 
Chart 1-8 Use of household income 
 
 
Chart 1-9 Changes in GDP growth (2004 - 2014) 
 
 
is increased markedly by the decline in inflation 
due to the reduction of energy prices. Next year’s 
minimum wage increase will add to the income of 
those with low earnings, while the rise in pensions 
will also exceed inflation. The expansion in real 
incomes may partly be offset by companies’ 
reaction to the increase in their tax burden 
resulting from the measures, i.e. a gradual 
reduction in labour costs. 
Growing real income points to an expansion in 
consumption. However, due to the continued 
balance-sheet adjustment, uncertain prospects for 
economic activity and tight credit conditions, 
households are expected to save a portion of the 
additional income or use it for debt reduction. 
Therefore, consumption may remain close to the 
current low level, while households’ net saving 
rate may remain high over the entire forecast 
horizon (Chart 1-8). 
Investment activity will decline considerably in 
2012 and may continue to shrink somewhat in 
2013. Over the forecast horizon investment 
activity in the private and government sectors is 
expected to diverge. In the private sector 
investment performance is expected to remain 
subdued for a prolonged period. Corporate 
investment activity is strongly limited by the 
unfavourable economic prospects and the 
persistently tight credit conditions. In addition, 
companies may react to the permanent increase in 
the tax burden by cut-backs in investment, 
resulting in a further decline in investment activity 
and keeping the investment rate at a historically 
low level. During balance-sheet adjustment, 
households are expected to adjust more strongly 
through their accumulation of savings than through 
their consumption expenditures. In the case of 
government investment, the projects financed by 
EU funds may lead to substantial growth, 
particularly in 2013. 
There continues to be considerable excess 
capacity in the economy. The output gap gradually 
closes over the forecast horizon, but will remain 
negative for the entire period. Companies will 
react to the production cost-increasing measures 
partly by restraining their investment activity, 
which, looking ahead, will reduce the supply 
capacities of the economy. Therefore, we expect 
low potential growth for a prolonged period of 
time in our forecast (Chart 1-9). 
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Box 1-1: Effects of the long-term increase in corporate tax burdens 
During 2012, the Government took numerous measures to improve the fiscal balance. A considerable 
portion of these measures changed the sector-specific taxes originally intended to be temporary into 
permanent sources of revenue. These taxes which are becoming permanent or are increasing will now 
impair corporate profitability not only temporarily, but over the long term as well. Although the job 
protection plan entails significant tax cuts for the companies involved, the balance of the all new tax 
measures on the corporate sector is negative. In addition, the considerable increase of the minimum 
wage in 2012-13 raises the operating cost of firms further. The total cost increase of firms compared to 
2011 exceeds 2 per cent of GDP. 
Although the tax increase primarily affects only a handful of sectors and their products, operating costs 
are expected to rise in the entire private sector due to strong and far-reaching input-output linkages. 
Companies can react to the temporary and permanent tax measures in different ways. If they consider 
the tax temporary, over the short run they may accept a decline in their profit, expecting that their 
profitability will be restored over the long term. In this case, they may offset the short-term loss in 
profit mainly by cost savings, and less by price increases. However, if the taxes are permanent, they 
need to adjust to restore the long-term return on investments. Therefore, companies may switch over to 
more labour-intensive production and may expand their capacities more slowly over the long term. All of 
this entails persistently lower investment activity. Earlier research conducted by the MNB also confirms 
that investment reacts to a permanent change in corporate profitability much more intensively than to 
temporary shocks.2 The slower growth of productive capacity also hinders employment growth. Finally, 
companies may attempt to shift a portion of the permanent taxes to their consumers, which results in an 
increase in inflation. This kind of pass-through may primarily become possible in the case of transaction-
based taxes (such as telecommunication tax, financial transaction duty, electronic road toll), because 
they increase the marginal cost of producer companies as well. 
Over our forecast horizon, the most important question is the speed of pass-through of the taxes to 
consumers. According to our baseline scenario, in the weak demand environment the pass-through can 
only be partial and protracted over time. Therefore, the increase in corporate tax burdens raises core 
inflation only gradually, in parallel with the closing of the output gap; cuts in operating costs also 
contribute to restoring profitability. 
In the alternative scenarios of the forecast, the significance of the channels of profit adjustment varies. 
With a higher nominal path, there is more room for the pass-through of the taxes to consumer prices in 
the near term already. On the other hand, the possibilities of price increases are more limited in a 
cyclical position that is weaker than the baseline scenario, thus labour costs need to adjust more. 
 
1.3 Labour market forecast 
Unfavourable developments in economic activity were coupled with a deterioration in the profit 
situation of the private sector, which was exacerbated by the fiscal adjustment measures that add to 
the corporate tax burden. Companies may adjust to the deterioration in profitability strongly in the 
labour market as well. Wage-cost decreases can take the form of cuts in non-wage benefits, and 
moderate wage growth in the case of above average earnings. In the context of weak demand conditions 
private sector employment is expected to remain broadly stagnant. 
                                                 
2 Reiff, Á. (2010): Firm-level adjustment costs and aggregate investment dynamics – Estimation on Hungarian data, MNB Working 
Papers, 2010/2. 




Chart 1-10: Employment and unemployment, total 
















In the period under review, in parallel with the 
unfavourable business conditions, a deterioration 
in profitability was observed; a decline in value 
added and an increase in employment also 
contributed to this. The assessment of the 
increase in the number of employed is surrounded 
by significant uncertainty; both cyclical and 
structural reasons may have played a role in it (for 
details, see Box 3-2).  
The number of those employed by larger 
companies, which account for a considerable 
portion of output, has remained practically 
unchanged since the crisis, and the increase in 
employment was typical of small companies (less 
than 10 people). Past experience indicates that 
small firms may flexibly adjust their workforce to 
changes in business activity; therefore, in the 
forecast they are expected to reduce employment 
in order to improve productivity. 
Administrative wage increases in 2012 and 2013 
have a lasting impact on nominal wages; however  
the direct effect of these measures is offset to a 
large extent by the government’s job protection 
plan.  Nonetheless, the effects feeding through on 
the salary scale may result in wage increases 
deviating from developments in productivity in the 
private sector companies. Based on the 2012 
experience, in order to maintain their internal 
wage differentiation, companies may carry out pay 
rises even in earning categories which were not 
directly affected by the administrative measures. 
Companies may react to the unfavourable business 
conditions and the deterioration in profitability 
due to the growing tax burden on the private 
sector by restraining wage dynamics. Although 
unemployment followed a gradually rising trend 
during the crisis, the labour market environment 
remains loose over the forecast horizon. 
Therefore, in our forecast, after the effect of the 
administrative measures fades out we expect 
moderate wage increases, restraining of non-wage 
benefits and stagnating employment, which will 
contribute to the correction of the profitability of 
the private sector. Government measures to 
increase labour market activity (Chart 1-10), the 
rising cost of capital and the job protection action 
plan resulting in lower cost of employment are all 
structural measures that point to a shift in the 
direction of labour intensive production over the 
long term. Accordingly, looking ahead, 
productivity and the profit rate may be 




persistently lower in the medium term than in the 
pre-crisis years (Chart 1-11). 
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2011 2012 2013 2014
Fact Projection
September Current September Current Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2,7 5,2 5,1 4,9 5,2 3,7
Core inflation without indirect tax effects 2,5 2,7 2,5 3,1 3,5 3,4
Consumer price index 3,9 5,8 5,7 5,0 3,5 3,2
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based)2 2,7 0,7 0,7 1,3 0,8 2,1
Household consumer expenditure 0,5 -1,0 -1,7 -0,8 -0,2 0,6
Government final consumption expenditure -0,5 -2,9 -2,0 -2,2 -2,7 -0,1
Fixed capital formation -3,6 -5,9 -5,1 0,0 -0,2 -1,0
Domestic absorption 0,1 -3,1 -3,8 -1,0 -0,8 0,2
Export 6,3 2,1 2,2 6,9 2,4 4,8
Import 5,0 0,6 -0,1 5,8 1,2 3,8
GDP3 1,6 -1,4 -1,4 0,7 0,5 1,5
External balance
Current account balance 0,9 2,1 2,0 3,6 3,7 4,3
External financing capacity 3,3 4,7 4,3 6,7 6,8 6,9
Government balance4
ESA balance 4,2 -3,7 (-2,8) -3,7 (-2,7) -2,7 (-2,4) -4,4 (-3.0) -5,2 (-3,8)
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings5,8 5,0 4,4 4,6 4,6 3,6 6,1
Whole-economy employment6 0,8 1,2 1,8 0,8 0,3 0,5
Private sector gross average earnings7 5,4 7,3 7,0 4,8 4,9 3,0
Private sector employment6 1,4 0,2 1,4 0,6 -0,3 0,4
Private sector unit labour cost6,8 5,3 5,2 7,6 4,8 2,8 1,5
Household real income9 2,3 -4,0 -4,2 -1,3 0,2 0,3
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 In line with the changes in Hungarian export structure by destination countries we revised the weights in our external demand indicator. 
3 The forecast for 2012 contains calendar effect.
4 As a percentage of GDP supposing the full cancellation of free central reserves.
5 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
6 December: according to the CSO LFS data, September: according to the CSO LFS data corrected by fostered workers.
7 According to the original CSO data for full-time employees.
8 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
9 MNB estimate.
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Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (December 2012) 5,7 3,5 3,2
Consensus Economics (November 2012)¹
 5.7 - 5.8 - 5.9 3.0 - 4.9 - 6.5 3,2
European Commission (November 2012) 5,6 5,3 3,9
IMF (October 2012) 5,6 3,5 3,0
OECD (November 2012) 5,8 4,8 3,9
Reuters survey (November 2012)¹
 5.7 - 5.8 - 6.0 3.5 - 4.8 - 6.5 2.5 - 3.7 - 4.5
GDP (annual growth rate. %)
MNB (December 2012) -1,5 0,5 1,5
Consensus Economics (November 2012)¹
 (-1.8) - (-1.3) - (-0.9) (-0.5) - (0.3) - (1.0) 2,2
European Commission (November 2012) -1.2 0.3 1,3
IMF (October 2012) (-1.0) 0,8 1,6
OECD (November 2012) -1.6 -0,1 1,2
Reuters survey (November 2012)¹
 (-1.8)  - (-1.3) - (-1.0)(-0.5)  - (0.1) - (0.8) -
Current account balance (percent of GDP)
MNB (December 2012) 2,0 3,7 4,3
European Commission (November 2012) 2,2 3,7 -
IMF (October 2012) 2,6 2,7 0,7
OECD (November 2012) 1,7 3,4 4,4
Budget Balance (ESA-95 method, percent of GDP)
MNB (December 2012) 2,7 3 3,8
Consensus Economics (November 2012)¹
 2.7 - 3.0 - 3.5 2.7 - 3.0 - 3.5 -
European Commission (November 2012) 2,5 2,9 3,5
IMF (October 2012) 2,9 3,7 3,8
OECD (November 2012) 3.0 2,7 2,7
Reuters survey (November 2012)¹
 2.7 - 2.9 - 3.8 2.6 - 2.9 - 3.8 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (December 2012) 1,0 2,2 4,6
European Commission (November 2012)² 1,3 3,4 5,6
IMF (October 2012)² 1,8 3,5 4,5
OECD (November 2012)² 1,1 3,2 5,5
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (December 2012) 0,7 0,8 2,1
Consensus Economics (November 2012)³ 0,6 1,1 -
European Commission (November 2012)² 0,7 1,1 2,1
IMF (October 2012)² 0,8 1,4 2,1
OECD (November 2012)² 0,7 0,9 2,1
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, %)
Consensus Economics (Novembert 2012)³ -0,5 0,0 -
European Commission (November 2012) -0,4 -0,1 1,2
IMF (October2012) -0,4 0,2 1,2
OECD (November 2012) -0,4 -0,1 1,2
3 Aggregate based on Euro area members included in our external demand indices.
1 For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the 
medium value), we also indicate the lowest and the highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data.
2 Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with 
the weighting system of the MNB, which is also used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. 
Certain institutions do not prepare forecast for all partner countries.
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), November 2012); European 
Commission Economic Forecasts (November 2012); IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2012); Reuters survey 
(November 2012); OECD Economic Outlook No. 91 (November 2012).
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2 EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS ON OUR FORECAST 
The Monetary Council assesses that risk perception of domestic assets is a considerable risk factor, and 
developments in risk premium are surrounded by two-sided risks. In addition, the Monetary Council 
selected two scenarios, which – in their opinion – can best capture the relevant risks in terms of 
conducting monetary policy in the future. The alternative scenarios present the uncertainty related to 
anchoring inflation expectations and the cyclical position of the economy. The continuous cost shocks 
and persistently above-target inflation suggest that the role of the inflation target in anchoring 
expectations has weakened, which may result in the production cost increases triggered by government 
measures passing through into prices more strongly. Accordingly, the first scenario is characterised by a 
higher nominal path, which requires tighter monetary policy than in the baseline scenario over the 
forecast horizon. There is considerable uncertainty about the potential output estimate, and 
accordingly it is possible that the decline in production capacities was lower than the assumption in the 
baseline scenario. In this case, the wider output gap has a stronger disinflationary effect. Consequently, 





Chart 2-1 The impact of the risk scenarios on our 











Despite relatively moderate underlying inflation 
developments, inflation in Hungary has been 
persistently and considerably above the target for 
a long period of time, which is partly attributable 
to the continuous, significant cost shocks to the 
economy in the past (food and oil price increases 
as well as tax measures with inflationary effects). 
This raises the possibility that the role of the 
inflation target in anchoring expectations has 
weakened, and that the pass-through of further 
continuous cost shocks into inflation expectations 
may result in stronger second-round effects. 
Fiscal adjustment measures and the further 
increase in the minimum wage result in an 
additional rise in production costs for the 
corporate sector. If companies expect a higher 
inflation trend, they will react to the cost increase 
by raising their prices, and in this case they may 
be more permissive in determining nominal wages 
as well. This risk is also strengthened by the 
considerable increase in minimum wages. The 
higher nominal path requires tighter monetary 
conditions, to attenuate the inflationary effect of 
the stronger feed-through of costs. In this 
scenario, growth is somewhat lower than in the 
baseline scenario, and inflation will reach the 
target more slowly (Chart 2-1). 
In recent years, inflation has generally been 
influenced by two divergent developments. Cost 
shocks increased inflation, while the loose labour 
market and weak domestic demand had an 
opposite effect. In the economy, long-term supply 
is determined by the production capacities existing 
in the economy. Accordingly, the disinflationary 
effect of domestic demand depends on unused 













Chart 2-2 The impact of the risk scenarios on our 












capacities. However, the potential growth rate 
estimate, which is necessary for determining the 
output gap, is highly uncertain, which was only 
exacerbated by the measurement difficulties 
related to estimating the negative effect of the 
crisis on potential output. Although the potential 
output path assumed in our model appears 
plausible on the basis of our estimations carried 
out using several methods and on the basis of 
international comparison, it cannot be ruled out 
that we have overestimated the capacity-reducing 
effect of the crisis in the baseline scenario.  
If this is case, the level of potential output may be 
higher, and the cyclical position of the economy 
may be more open. In the case of a more open 
cyclical position, the corporate sector is able to 
adjust to cost shocks through price increases to a 
lesser extent, and thus the effect of government 
measures on inflation may be weaker, while cost-
reducing efforts may have a more relevant role in 
the corporate sector’s adjustment process.. Under 
such conditions, the price-reducing effect of weak 
demand is stronger, and the labour market is 
looser, resulting in lower inflation on the whole. In 
the case of the more favourable inflation path, by 
end-2014, the inflation target may be achieved 
even with a monetary policy that is looser than the 
baseline scenario. In this scenario, the economy 
may grow faster than the assumption in the 
baseline scenario (Chart 2-2). 
Future developments in risk perception related to 
domestic assets are surrounded by two-sided risks. 
The dual trends of weak global economic activity 
and strong risk appetite in global financial 
markets, along with uncertainty about domestic 
economic policy, entail the risk of a possible 
correction in risk premiums, and this would justify 
a more cautious monetary policy. At the same 
time, progress in European crisis management and 
institutional reforms, fading risks in relation to the 
“fiscal cliff” problem in US, and improving 
expectations related to the success of efforts to 
consolidate the domestic budget may help reduce 
risk premia, which in turn may increase the room 
for manoeuvre in monetary policy. 
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3 MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
3.1 The international environment 
Global economic growth continued to decelerate in Q3. Economic activity declined both in the 
developed and developing countries, while the economy of the euro area, which is the most important 
trading partner of Hungary, slid back into technical recession by the second half of the year. With 
regard to global trends in inflation, demand-side inflationary effects remain subdued, but consumer 
price indices are above central bank targets in most regions, due to the significant commodity price 
increases observed in recent quarters. 
Global money market sentiment continued to be optimistic. The liquidity-increasing measures of central 
banks of developed countries resulted in a tangible improvement in investors’ risks tolerance, 
considerably strengthening capital inflows to emerging markets. The Central and Eastern European 
region proved to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of these developments. The durability of this 
improvement in investor sentiment may continue to be significantly influenced by developments in the 
European debt crisis and expectations regarding fiscal consolidation in the United States. 
Chart 3-1 GDP growth in major economies 
(quarterly change in seasonally adjusted data; 
2006 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
 
Chart 3-2 Business cycle indicators in major 
economies (OECD CLI, 2006 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
 
3.1.1 Developments in global economic 
activity 
Growth in the developed and developing countries 
continued to decelerate in Q3 (Chart 3-1). 
Although business activity in the United States 
showed a slight improvement, the euro area fell 
back into technical recession, while the output of 
the Japanese economy declined in Q3. The 
average growth rate slowed down in emerging 
countries with close trade relations with the 
developed economies (and thus in the Central and 
Eastern European region as well). In terms of 
global economic prospects, the US fiscal cliff and 
the developments in the European debt crisis 
continue to be the most important risks. 
The US economy continued to grow in Q3, as GDP 
expanded by 2.5 per cent on a year-on-year basis. 
Weakening demand and households’ protracted 
deleveraging are steadily slowing down economic 
recovery, whereas the disturbances caused by 
Hurricane Sandy resulted in a temporary decline in 
output. In an environment of weak economic 
activity, the latest liquidity expansion measures of 
the Fed focus on the stabilisation of growth. Short-
term leading indicators point to mild strengthening 
in activity and consumption, whilst the mid-term 
growth outlooks remain weak. The Fed is working 
to support a durable improvement in growth and 
employment by broadening its liquidity expansion 
programs and with its long-term commitment to 
low Fed funds rates, as expressed in the 
announced explicit unemployment rate and 
inflation figures. Temporal growth prospects in the 







Chart 3-3 Growth projections of the IMF and the 







Chart 3-4 Changes in major commodity prices (in 





US will primarily be influenced by the 
development of fiscal policy following the 
presidential election. The extent and structure of 
fiscal consolidation due to the debt ceiling may 
have a significant impact on both global growth 
and risk tolerance. 
Euro-area GDP declined by 0.6 per cent on a year-
on-year basis, and thus the economy of the euro 
area slipped into recession by mid-year. Growth 
trends continue to be characterised by strong 
duality: the output of periphery countries is 
declining considerably, while the economies of 
core countries are proving to be more resistant. 
However, during the past quarter the slowdown in 
growth became increasingly obvious in this group 
of economies as well. The most important 
forward-looking business cycle indicators fell to a 
three-year low in September, and did not show any 
substantial adjustment until November (Chart 3-2), 
thus, the recession may continue until the end of 
the year. Weakening global economic activity and 
the ongoing process of deleveraging – especially in 
countries with high debt levels – will continue to 
restrain growth in the region in the years to come, 
and consequently, the recovery after the recession 
may remain subdued over the entire forecast 
horizon. 
In the largest emerging countries, growth 
continued to decelerate, albeit from high rates. 
Growth in China declined to 7.4 per cent in Q3. 
The slowdown in economic activity was mainly 
attributable to weaker expansion in export sales. 
Fading demand in developed economies slows 
down growth in the regions concerned through the 
traditional trading channel. At the same time, the 
strong capital inflows typical of emerging markets 
restrain exports through the appreciation of the 
exchange rate as well. In terms of developments in 
domestic demand, the emergence of domestic 
asset price bubbles may continue to pose the 
greatest risk. 
The average growth rate in Central and Eastern 
Europe decelerated, with strong heterogeneity. On 
a year-on-year basis, the region’s GDP expanded 
by 0.7 per cent in Q3. The economies of Poland 
and Slovakia were more resistant to the impacts of 
global economic cycle: their growth rates of 
around 2.5 per cent are still outstanding in the 
region. By contrast, the recession continued in the 
Czech Republic in Q3 as well: the 1.5 per cent 
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Chart 3-5 Changes in Brent oil price in various 





Chart 3-6 Inflation in major economies (in %; year-










year-on-year decline nearly matches the figure for 
Hungary. GDP contracted in Romania as well, 
albeit to a lesser extent. 
The prospects of the external markets which are 
the most important for the Hungarian economy 
continued to deteriorate in the past quarter. 
Following growth in July, German industry 
recorded gradual declines during the autumn. The 
main forward-looking German indicators suggest 
further declines, based on both new industrial 
orders and the Ifo index. Euro-area growth may 
return in 2013, but the recovery may remain slow. 
According to the majority of forecasts, the 
economic prospects of the most important export 
partners of Hungary has deteriorated considerably 
in the past months. Next year, the expansion in 
Hungary’s external markets may support domestic 
growth to a lesser extent than previously expected 
as well (chart 3-3). 
3.1.2 Global trends in inflation 
Despite weakening growth prospects, during the 
autumn months commodity prices remained close 
to the relatively high levels observed early in the 
year. With slight fluctuations, the world market 
price of oil stabilised around USD 110 (Chart 3-4, 
Chart 3-5). At the same time, global risk 
tolerance, which was improving in parallel with 
the announcements of the central banks of 
developed countries, strengthened the euro as 
well. As a result, oil prices expressed in euro 
declined considerably. The Israeli-Gaza conflict 
may continue to pose a major geopolitical risk in 
terms of oil price changes over the short run. 
Owing to globally weak harvest results, 
unprocessed food prices rose to a historically high 
level in the summer months. Based on futures 
prices, a significant decline can only be expected 
from mid-2013, with the appearance of the new 
harvest. 
The increase in commodity prices triggered 
stronger cost-side inflationary effects at the global 
level. Supply-side inflationary pressure was 
stronger in emerging countries, while inflation was 
around the target in developed countries. The 
medium-term inflation outlook continues to be 
subdued in the latter economies, which allows a 
permanent maintenance of loose monetary 
conditions. The consumer price index fell to 2.2 
per cent in the USA in October, and reached this 
level in the euro area in November (Chart 3-6). 
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Chart 3-7 Changes in interbank and swap market 
spreads (September 2011 – November 2012) 
 
 
Chart 3-8 Developments in major stock market 
indices (September 2011 – November 2012) 
 
 
Chart 3-9 Changes in risk indices (January 2012 – 
November 2012) 
 
VAT increases in Italy and Spain also played a role 
in the previous acceleration of inflation in the 
euro area. Japan has not been able to avoid 
deflation in recent months either. With the 
exception of China, faster inflation was observed 
in the larger emerging economies, where economic 
activity is typically more favourable. 
In the Central and Eastern European region, annual 
inflation grew slightly in the Czech Republic and 
more strongly in Romania in the past quarter. In 
spite of the short-term increase in inflation, 
demand-side inflationary pressure continues to be 
generally weak. The price indices relevant for 
monetary policy (excluding commodity price 
shocks and indirect tax increases) did not indicate 
mounting inflationary pressure. 
3.1.3 Monetary policy and financial 
market developments 
Against the background of a deteriorating 
economic outlook and low underlying inflation 
developments, developed countries maintained 
loose monetary conditions. Improving risk 
sentiment and worsening growth prospects allowed 
the central bank base rates in emerging countries 
to be reduced. Of the central banks of the region, 
the Czech central bank reached a near-zero 
interest rate level with two interest rate cuts 
(easing of 45 basis point in total); therefore, the 
decision-makers cannot reduce the interest rate 
any further. The Polish National Bank reduced the 
base rate two times, by 25 basis points in 
November and in December. 
Sentiment on the global financial market 
continued to be optimistic in recent months. The 
positive effects of the earlier liquidity providing 
and/or crisis management measures undertaken by 
the major central banks were felt in the autumn 
months as well (Chart 3-7, Chart 3-8). Emerging 
markets benefited considerably from the ample 
liquidity: capital inflows into these markets 
increased markedly, reducing risk premia on the 
assets of these countries. The EU regulation on 
uncovered CDS transactions also contributed to the 
above development in the Central and Eastern 
European EU Member States. Until November, as a 
result of this technical effect, a greater decline in 
premia was observed in our region, compared to 
other emerging regions (Chart 3-9). 
Developments in the European debt crisis had a 
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 much smaller influence on market sentiment than 
in the first half of the year. Although there has 
been some progress recently (e.g. the Greek 
agreement), several outstanding problems have 
not been solved in a satisfactory manner (e.g. 
budget sustainability in Spain or the banking union 
issue). At present, markets are mainly concentrate 
on the talks regarding the US fiscal adjustment 
and the changes in global growth prospects. 
3.2 Aggregate demand 
The contraction of the Hungarian economy continued in Q3. In addition to domestic demand, which has 
been weak for a longer time, the weakening external business activity also increasingly contributed to 
the recession. Household and government consumption as well as investment activity continued to the 
decline in the past quarter; only net exports made a positive contribution to growth. The decline in 
domestic demand continues to be dominated by the protracted reduction of debts accumulated prior to 
the crisis, the generally tight lending conditions, the fiscal balance improving measures and the effects 
of the uncertainty related to the medium-term prospects. 
The unfavourable demand environment, and within that mainly the permanently and considerably 
declining household consumption continue to have a strong disinflationary effect, mitigating the feed-






Chart 3-10 Structure of annual change in domestic 








Hungary’s gross domestic product continued to 
contract in 2012 Q3, as GDP was 1.5 per cent 
below the figure of the same period of last year. 
The level of aggregate demand showed a decline 
for the third consecutive quarter (Chart 3-10). 
The recession is caused by the combination of 
weakening external demand and permanently 
subdued domestic demand. Household and 
government consumption as well as investment 
activity continued to decline in the past quarter, 
while the contribution of net exports to growth 
continued to be strongly positive. 
3.2.1 Foreign trade 
Demand in Hungary’s external markets continued 
to weaken in Q3. The global slowdown was 
increasingly seen in export sales to Germany as 
well, which are of key importance within 
Hungarian exports. 
Hungary’s industrial export sales have been 
subdued in recent months. The production 
capacities in the automotive industry that are 
gradually coming online have improved goods 
exports to a lesser extent than previously 
expected. In addition to the general slowdown in 
external markets, this may be attributable to the 
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Chart 3-11 Changes in the volumes of goods and 
services exports (2005 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
Chart 3-12 Changes in retail sales, earnings and 
the consumer confidence index (January 2005 – 
November 2012) 
 
Chart 3-13 Net quarterly change in outstanding 
domestic loans to households; breakdown by loan 
purpose (2005 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
 
fact that the market positions of the parent 
companies of several major domestic exporters 
have weakened considerably in recent years due to 
the global crisis. The resulting decline in 
production reduced Hungary’s export sales as well 
(for more details on this subject, see Box 4-2). 
Exports of services have gradually decreased in 
recent quarters. The slowdown in exports of the 
transportation sectors, which are strongly sensitive 
to external market cycles, also contributed to the 
slower dynamics, along with the more subdued 
expansion in tourism revenues (Chart 3-11). Net 
exports increased in Q3 as well. Main factor behind 
the increase in net exports was weak demand for 
imports. 
3.2.2 Household consumption 
Household consumption declined considerably in 
Q3. The most important macroeconomic factors 
that determine consumption generally contributed 
to restraining household demand. Despite an 
expansion in employment and a significant 
increase in wages in the competitive sector, the 
real net wage bill continued to decline. 
Administrative wage increases in lower earning 
categories offset the impact of the tax measures 
taken at beginning of the year, but accelerating 
inflation generally eroded real incomes. The 
household confidence indicator remained 
unchanged over the last half year, but remains at 
a historically low level (Chart 3-12). 
Household behaviour continues to be determined 
by the gradual reduction of debts accumulated 
before the crisis. Households continued to be net 
repayers of debt in Q3 as well. Following the early 
repayment programme, outstanding household 
loans declined in all loan categories nearly to the 
same extent in Q2 and Q3. No major shift was 
observed in newly disbursed loans in the past 
months either; banks’ lending activity was at a 
historically low level (Chart 3-13). 
During recent months, the currency structure of 
household loans was significantly influenced by the 
conversion of foreign exchange loans ninety days 
past due into forints. Within the framework of the 
government programme, banks cancelled one 
quarter of the foreign exchange loans of the 
households that met the relevant conditions, with 
the remaining portion converted into forint loans. 
Cancellation of a part of the loan debt also 
resulted in a visible change in the monthly figures. 
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Chart 3-14 Whole-economy investment in 
machinery (2001 Q1 – 2012 Q2; year-on-year) 
 
Chart 3-15 Net quarterly change in outstanding 
domestic loans to corporations; breakdown by 
maturity (2005 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
Chart 3-16 Construction of new housing and 
number of building permits issued quarterly (2001 
Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
Compared to total outstanding household loans, 
however, the converted amount is not significant, 
especially in relation to the effects of the early 
repayment programme that took place at the 
beginning of the year. 
3.2.3 Private investment 
Against the background of a weak demand outlook 
and increasingly tight lending conditions, domestic 
income owners continue to be characterised by 
cautious investment activity (Chart 3-14). Private 
investment continued to decline in Q3 as well, 
although more slowly than before. 
Corporate investment was characterised by the 
dual trends of the past period. Underlying 
investment developments continue to be weak in 
the majority of sectors, and within that mainly 
among those that produce for the domestic 
market. Because of the persistently weak, highly 
uncertain prospects, the corporate sector’s 
interest in new investments is weak. At the same 
time, in certain manufacturing sectors the large 
individual automotive investment projects, which 
are progressing as scheduled, continue to result in 
considerable investment activity. 
In 2012 Q3, the corporate lending activity of the 
domestic financial intermediary system continued 
to decline, although to a lesser extent than in the 
previous periods (Chart 3-15). There was a drop in 
both short-term and long-term corporate loans; 
the decline in outstanding loans amounted to a 
total HUF 82 billion. No significant improvement 
was observed either on the demand side or supply 
side in terms of the factors that fundamentally 
determine corporate lending developments. With 
the steadily weak investment requirement, 
demand for long-term loans continued to be 
subdued among companies, and the deterioration 
in industrial production restrained short-term 
borrowing as well. On the supply side, the 
maintenance of the strict lending conditions of the 
banking sector and further slight tightening3 of 
such conditions is also hindering growth in lending. 
Household investment continued to decline in Q3. 
Based on housing market indicators, the 
construction and sale of new homes was also close 
to a historical low. The trend of the number of 
                                                 
3 Based on the November 2012 Lending Survey conducted by the MNB. 
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Chart 3-17 Changes in inventories at current 
prices and according to GDP, and inventory level 




Chart 3-18 Changes in government expenditures
 
new building permits indicates historically low 
activity in the coming quarters as well (Chart 3-
16). In parallel with the introduction of the 
interest rate subsidy schemes, a slight easing of 
lending conditions started on the supply side. By 
contrast, no improvement has been seen in the 
volume of new lending compared to the historical 
low observed in Q2. Developments in lending to 
households tend to be determined by the demand 
side. Following the earlier debt accumulation, the 
balance-sheet adjustment process presumably 
continues to be an important element in the 
behaviour of households, which considerably 
reduces the investment activity of this sector. 
3.2.4 Inventories 
Uncertain growth prospects and tight corporate 
lending conditions continue to justify the 
maintenance of the tight inventory management 
typical since the crisis in the private sector. Due to 
unfavourable weather conditions and considerable 
drought damage, the reduction of agricultural 
inventories may make a significant contribution to 
the decline in inventories (Chart 3-17). 
3.2.5 Government demand 
Government consumption demand is determined 
by the fiscal adjustment measures launched earlier 
and taken additionally this year. The funding of 
government investment continues to be 
characterised by strong duality: the ratio of 
investment implemented exclusively from 
budgetary sources continues to decline, which was 
offset by an increase in the projects which can be 
implemented from EU funds (Chart 3-18). 
 
Box 3-1 Changes in Hungary’s export market share in recent years 
Since the 2008–2009 crisis, expansion in the production of export-oriented sectors has contributed 
significantly to the growth of the Hungarian economy. But despite the automotive industry capacities 
launched production in recent years, the increase in Hungarian exports in the past three years hardly 
exceeded the expansion in the imports of Hungary’s export markets compared to the previous period. In 
addition to cyclical developments related to the global slowdown, this may be attributable to structural 
reasons as well. 
It was observed in previous years that export growth is rather sensitive to changes in external demand. 
The underlying reason is that semi-finished and intermediate products constitute a large portion of 
Hungary’s exports. Demand for them reacts to changes in demand in a much more sensitive manner than 
the demand for consumer goods. 4Accordingly, a slowdown in global economic activity entails a slowdown 
                                                 
4 Trade Volatility and Intermediate Goods, Pu Chen (2010) 
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in Hungary’s export market share, while pick-ups in economic activity result in increases in the export 
market share. 
The deceleration in export dynamics exceeded that of Hungary’s competitors in the region, which may 
indicate a relative deterioration in Hungary’s competitiveness. Most often this is measured by the change 
in export market share, i.e. the quotient of Hungary’s exports and the imports of its export markets 
(Chart 3-19 and 3-20). In the pre-crisis years, Hungary’s export market share increased by an annual rate 
of 4–5 per cent on average. At the beginning of the crisis, the real exchange rate of the forint 
depreciated considerably, contributing to an expansion in Hungary’s market share at the turn of 2009-
2010. Since 2010 H2, however, average growth of merely 0.5 per cent was observed. Based on earlier 
domestic and international experiences, the Mercedes factory starting production and the depreciation 
of the real exchange rate at the beginning of the year would have justified an increase in the export 
market share. There may be several factors behind the subdued dynamics of the export market share. 
During the global slowdown, several large Hungarian exporters have struggled with competitiveness 
problems, resulting in reorganisations and reductions in production (e.g. Nokia, Flextronics) or even 
bankruptcy (e.g. Elcoteq, Malév). This is confirmed by the fact that since the crisis, the share prices of 
the largest Hungarian exporters (and/or of their international parent companies) have often 
underperformed the share prices of their competitors in the sector (Chart 3-21). Accordingly, the 
protracted weakness of Hungary’s export market share may be related to the major Hungarian exporters’ 
deteriorating competitive position at the global level. 
Chart 3-19 Changes in Hungary’s export market 
share (based on volumes) 
Chart 3-20 Changes of the export market share in 
the region 
  
Compared with that of neighbouring countries, Hungary’s ability to attract capital deteriorated in the 
past decade. Not only does this mean that dynamically developing companies preferred to settle in the 
neighbouring countries in recent years, it also means that some of the ones that had settled in Hungary 
before moved their production to other countries. The share of Hungary in foreign investment in 
manufacturing accumulated in the region declined between 2000 and 2009. Missing foreign investment 
may also have played a role in the continuous decline in the manufacturing investment rate (Chart 3-22). 
Moreover, since the crisis, manufacturing investment activity has continued to decline due to the credit 
crunch and a fall in propensity to invest, despite the large investment projects in the automotive 
industry. This may indicate that, in addition to deteriorating external demand, structural problems may 
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Chart 3-21 Relative shift in the stock index of 
electronics companies compared to competitors 
Chart 3-22 Net investment rate in manufacturing 
  
The increase in Hungary’s export market share is fundamentally limited by the ongoing global balance-
sheet adjustment (both in the private and public sectors), which reduces borrowing from both the 
demand and supply sides, and thus the volume of investment as well. If export demand starts to grow 
again, with a pick-up in investment the increase in export market share may also accelerate. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that the slowdown in exports is attributable to competitiveness reasons, and that 
the unfavourable developments observed in recent quarters will continue. 
As a result of the persistently weak investment activity, we can expect only anaemic growth in Hungary’s 
export market share over the forecast horizon. 
3.3 Production and potential output 
Economic output continued to slightly decline in 2012 Q3. In parallel with the persistently subdued 
performance of the sectors producing for the domestic market, the weakening external economic 
activity resulted in an increasingly pronounced fall in production in the industrial sectors as well. Due 
to extremely unfavourable weather conditions, the agricultural crop failure reduced whole economy 
output markedly. 
The persistently weak investment activity and the steadily high rate of unemployment continue to call 
attention to the structural weaknesses of economic growth. The expansion of the supply capacities of 
the economy has slowed down considerably in recent years. The slower expansion of supply capacities 















Domestic output continued to contract in Q3 as 
well, although more slowly than at the beginning 
of the year. GDP declined by 0.2 percentage 
points compared to the previous quarter. 
Decelerating growth was observed in sectors 
producing for the domestic market as well as 
those producing for external markets. The 
slowdown in Hungary’s export markets resulted in 
a fall in output even in the export-oriented 
production sectors which had previously shown 
dynamic performance. The performance of 
sectors producing for the domestic market 
remained generally weak. Value added in 
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Chart 3-23 Structure of annual change in domestic 
GDP (2005 Q1 -2012 Q3) 
 
 
Chart 3-24 Industrial production, new orders and 
the ESI confidence indicator* (2005 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
 
Chart 3-25 Changes in construction output, 
contracts and building-type investment (2005 Q1 – 
2012 Q3). 
 
agriculture declined considerably due to the 
drought conditions, which had a significant impact 
on developments in whole-economy output, 
despite the low weight of the sector (Chart 3-23). 
After stagnating in Q3, industrial production 
declined markedly in October. The performance of 
the chemical industry improved, thanks to the 
adjustment of one-off effects from the summer, 
which were mainly related to the partial and 
planned closure of the MOL oil refinery. At the 
same time, in the machine industry, growth in 
vehicle manufacturing, which had lasted for 
several months, came to a halt. Although a shift 
expansion was carried out in the Kecskemét plant 
of Mercedes as of September, its result is expected 
to only be reflected in the Q4 data. In line with 
the generally weakening business conditions, the 
decline in production was typical of a wider range 
of sectors. The downturn in the production of the 
electronics sector continues to be strong. 
Compared to earlier months, prospects for 
domestic industry deteriorated; following the 
outliers in March and April, in the autumn months 
new orders fell below the levels observed early in 
the year, while new German orders also declined 
slightly. Overall, until the end of the year no 
major change is expected in the underlying trend 
in domestic industrial production (Chart 3-24). 
Following a continuous decline lasting more than 5 
years, construction output expanded in Q3. This 
favourable development was mainly due to the 
significant expansion observed in government 
infrastructure investment (road and railway 
reconstruction). With regard to building type 
constructions, the two different trends between 
the two main groups continued during the quarter 
under review. Construction works related mainly 
to the private sector remain subdued, while 
building investment primarily related to the public 
sector expanded considerably during the quarter. 
Building contracts also followed opposing trends in 
the case of the two main groups of structures. In 
the months ahead, building-type production is 
expected to continue contracting in the 
construction industry, while mild growth is 
expected in the construction of other structures, 
mainly within the framework of government 
projects. Based on the total amount of orders of 
the sector, the situation in the industry may be 
characterised by stagnating production in the 
coming quarters (Chart 3-25 and 3-26). 
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Chart 3-26 Changes in volume in the two main 




Chart 3-27 Corn and wheat crop yields (2004 – 
2012) 
 
Chart 3-28 Monthly dynamics in retail sales 




Agricultural harvest results declined considerably, 
due to unfavourable weather conditions. Based on 
harvest estimates and yields of major crops, the 
sector’s performance this year is much weaker not 
only compared to last year, but also compared to 
the historical average. The most striking fall was 
recorded in harvest yields of corn, whereas the 
shortfalls are less significant in the case of wheat 
and other major crops (Chart 3-27). 
The total volume of retail trade reflected an 
increasingly sharp downturn during the quarter 
(Chart 3-28). The decline in sales is observed in a 
wide range of products. The most significant fall in 
sales continues to be typical of consumer durables, 
while food sales fell to a lesser extent. The steady 
increase in turnover observed in the catering 
sector this year continued in the autumn months. 
On an annual basis, the number of guest nights 
spent at various places of accommodation 
increased by more than 9 per cent in October. This 
growth was observed in the case of both domestic 
and foreign guests. The improving performance of 
this sector was supported by the weaker forint 
exchange rate in earlier years, as well as 
developments implemented in the sector (mainly 
from EU funds). 
The performance of the financial services sector 
declined markedly during the quarter. Output from 
traditional banking operations of banks, branch 
offices of credit institutions and cooperative credit 
institutions was weak during the quarter. Credit 
activity remained subdued, and the income of 
insurer companies declined because of the fall in 
premiums. 
Our view of the potential level of output remained 
unchanged compared to the situation described in 
the September issue of the Quarterly Report on 
Inflation. The new capacity-increasing investment 
projects implemented in the automotive industry 
are still unable to fully offset the broad-based 
decline observed in investment. Accordingly, the 
growth rate of capital stock may have continued to 
decline this year. So far, the pick-up in labour 
supply observed in recent years has mainly been 
reflected in the increase in public employment, 
which is characterised by lower productivity. The 
unemployment rate declined this year, but 
remains at a high level, which may pose a risk in 
terms of the rise in permanent unemployment. 
Overall, the developments observed both in the 
labour market and capital accumulation suggest a 
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3.4 Employment and labour market 
Activity and employment continued to expand in the domestic labour market in Q3. The increase in 
employment was mainly due to the expansion of public employment, but according to the labour force 
survey, the number of employed grew in the private sector as well, mainly in relation to market 
services and firms with less than 10 people. In line with the persistently high unemployment figures, 
the labour market can still be considered loose. 
A slowdown in wage indices was observed in a wide range of sectors in recent months. The loose labour 
market environment continues to point to more restrained wage developments, thus mitigating second-
round inflation risks appearing through the labour market, while production costs are increasing. 
 
Chart 3-30 Changes in activity compared to 2008 




The slow increase in both activity and employment 
continued in 2012 Q3. Rising by around 2 
percentage points compared to the pre-crisis 
level, the activity rate reached 57 per cent. 
Government stimulus measures, in particular the 
changes to the conditions of old-age and disability 
retirement as well as the tightening of 
unemployment benefits, played a significant role 
in this trend (Charts 3-30). 
The statistics available on employment 
developments have been quite varied in recent 
quarters (Charts 3-31). Institutional labour force 
statistics once again reflected a stagnation in the 
past quarter. According to labour force survey 
data, the number of people employed in the whole 
economy increased slightly in recent months, 
primarily due to the expansion of public 
employment. Based on these statistics, private 
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Chart 3-31 Number of employed in the private 
sector calculated on the basis of institutional 








sector employment also increased compared to the 
previous quarter. The expansion mainly took place 
at market service providers and firms with less 
then 10 employees. 
In parallel with the increase in activity and 
employment, the unemployment rate continued to 
edge lower in Q3. As in the past, this results from 
the public work programmes, which slightly 
reduced the number of long-term unemployed as 
well (Charts 3-32). 
The unemployed-to-vacancy ratio continues to be 
high. No major shift in the Beveridge curve was 
observed in the past quarter, and thus the labour 
market can still be considered loose. 
 
Box 3-2 Possible reasons of increasing employment in the labour force survey 
The differences between various employment statistics were discussed in a box in the September issue of 
the Quarterly Report on Inflation. The uncertainty experienced in employment statistics also makes the 
calculation of reliable productivity indicators difficult. It is important to understand the differences 
between the two types of statistics for this reason as well. 
Data from institutional statistics (IS) and the labour force survey (LFS) are available for measuring the 
number of employees. The LFS is based on individual inquiries and represents the domestic labour 
market as a whole, whereas the IS contain data provided by enterprises that employ more than 4 people 
and by budgetary institutions. In addition, there are other methodological differences as well between 
the two types of statistics. Of these differences, it is important to emphasise that the LFS is able to 
capture the number of people employed in public work programmes only with a high degree of 
uncertainty; consequently, their classification into sectors is also uncertain. 
LFS data have already reflected a steady expansion of employment in the private sector since 2011, 
while according to the IS the number of employed has been declining since mid-2011. 
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One of the reasons for the difference between the data for the number of employed may be the 
different recording of public employment. In the IS, the number of people in the non-profit sector and 
the number of public workers are separated from the private sector. However, since 2009 developments 
in employment in the non-profit sector have showed strong co-movement with developments in public 
worker employment, indicating that some of the public workers are employed through non-profit 
companies. At the same time, non-profit enterprises cannot be separated in the LFS; they appear as a 
part of the competitive sector, and this may explain the differences between the two types of statistics. 
Another reason for the difference between the employment statistics may be that the statistics cover 
different scopes of companies. Based on the individual-level data of the LFS, it is possible to calculate 
the change in number of employees in categories according to the number of employed. According to 
these statistics, since the peak of the crisis, employment has expanded considerably (by some 75,000 
people) again among micro enterprises that employ less than 10 registered employees (see Chart 3-33). 
As a result, the number of people employed by these companies was close to pre-crisis levels by the 
middle of this year. By contrast, employment at larger companies was unable to move from the levels 
typically seen at the peak of the crisis. Micro enterprises are not covered by the IS, so their expansion 
does not influence the changes in IS statistics. 
Chart 3-33 Number of employees in the private sector according to company size 
(seasonally adjusted quarterly LFS data) 
 
The expansion of employment at micro enterprises contrasts with the developments in economic 
activity. However, only very little data and with relatively high measurement uncertainty are available 
for this scope of companies. In addition, the proportion of black employment and grey or black economic 
activities is greater among these companies, which also impairs data quality (for detailed data and their 
impact on productivity calculation see the special topic entitled Factors explaining the productivity 
shortfall.) 
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3.5 Cyclical position of the economy 
The economy continues to be characterised by a significant amount of excess capacity, and thus the 
disinflationary effect of weak demand can still be considered strong. The output gap, which was 
gradually closing until the second half of last year, may have widened again as a result of this year’s 
recession. Internal and external factors alike contributed to the expansion of excess capacities. In 
particular, the steep decline in household consumption may have a restraining influence on pricing 
decisions. The weaker economic environment and the increase in production costs significantly impact 
corporate profitability, adding to the sector’s need to adjust. 
 
 
Chart 3-34 Demand constraints in the main sectors 
according to the ESI survey (2002 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
 







The dual trends of recession in the real economy 
and high price and wage dynamics continued in Q3 
as well. In the past period, the economy was hit by 
major cost shocks, which may have played a 
considerable role in the development of the high 
nominal path. On the other hand, there are 
several signs indicating that the disinflationary 
effect of demand may have remained significant in 
the past quarters as well. 
Based on the capacity utilisation indicators of the 
private sector, demand conditions may have 
remained weak in Q3 (Charts 3-34). In line with 
weak international economic activity, industrial 
capacity utilisation has been declining since early 
2011. As a result of the balance-sheet adjustment 
since the crisis, the services sector may be 
characterised by permanent excess capacity. 
The disinflationary effect of demand may be 
reflected in the subdued developments in the 
prices of consumer durables and market services. 
At the same time, the prices of many services 
typically change in January, and therefore, the 
strength of the disinflationary effect from the 
supply side can be more precisely determined 
when the inflation figures for the beginning of 
next year are seen. 
According to our current estimate, the output gap 
has gradually opened up since 2011, as a combined 
result of the renewed weakening in external 
demand and in domestic demand, which has been 
subdued for a longer period of time (Charts 3-35). 
In line with the deteriorating cyclical position, the 
profitability of the corporate sector also fell in 
recent quarters. In addition to deteriorating 
productivity, rising wage costs stemming from the 
administrative wage increases and the increasing 
production costs stemming from the high levels of 
raw material prices also contributed to the 
deterioration in profitability (Charts 3-36). In many 
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Chart 3-36 Changes in productivity, real wages 
and profit rate (2005 – 2012) 
 
 
corporate sectors, the adjustment to the 
temporary presumed tax increases may have also 
contributed to the weaker profitability. Along with 
the cyclical fall in demand, the increase in 
employment which has been observed for several 
quarters also contributed to the weakening of 
productivity. Structural factors may also be behind 
the increase in the number of employed, and thus 
the deterioration in productivity and the decline in 
the profit rate may partly be a trend-like 
phenomenon (developments in productivity are 
analysed in detail in Chapter 6.1.). 
3.6 Costs and inflation 
Following the September peak, annual consumer price inflation decelerated significantly in the autumn 
months. The decline in the price index was mainly attributable to falling fuel prices. Although to a 
lesser extent, the decline in inflationary pressure was also reflected in the indicators of underlying 
inflation, which show the strong disinflationary effects of the continuing contraction in domestic 
demand. In addition to weak demand, the forint exchange rate, which stabilised at a stronger level in 
the past half year compared to the level observed at the beginning of the year, also helped mitigate 
underlying inflation. 
Following a significant acceleration early in the year, the wage index of the private sector declined in 
recent months. The government wage compensation offset the direct cost-increasing effects of the 
administrative wage increases, but in the private sector the effects feeding through the salary scale 
resulted in wage increases that decoupled from developments in productivity. In the short run, rising 
unit labour costs may force further adjustment on the part of the companies concerned. 
Chart 3-37 Changes in regular gross monthly 
average earnings in the private sector (January 




In September 2012, regular earnings increased by 
4.3 per cent in the whole economy and by 6.8 per 
cent in the private sector, while they declined by 
1.7 per cent in the general government (including 
employees in public work schemes). Following a 
significant wage increase early in the year, the 
wage index of the private sector has declined in 
recent months (Charts 3-37). Slower wage 
dynamics were especially apparent in 
manufacturing, which may also have been 
attributable to the mid-year changes to 
regulations concerning shift compensation and to 
the decline in industrial production in the autumn 
(Charts 3-38). 
Regular earnings increased by an average of 8 per 
  38/69 
Chart 3-38 Regular monthly earnings (January 
2004 – September 2012) 
 
 
Chart 3-39 Changes and components of unit labour 
cost in the private sector (2006 Q1 – 2012 Q3) 
 
Chart 3-40 Agricultural producer prices (January 
2005 – October 2012) 
 
Note: Seasonal products: fruits, vegetables, potatoes; cereals: 
wheat, oil seeds; products of animal origin: pork, poultry 
meat, egg, milk. Weighting was based on the estimated size of 
the effects on the consumer price index. 
cent in H1, which was attributable to the 
administrative measures entering into force at the 
beginning of the year. The measures resulted in a 
surge in the wage index, mainly for employees 
with low earnings. However, wages of employees 
in higher earning categories, which were not 
directly affected by the measures, also increased; 
the compensation provided by the government did 
not cover these wages (a more detailed overview 
of the subject can be found in Box 3.3). 
Inflationary pressures from the labour market may 
be offset by several factors. Companies continue 
to cut back non-regular pay components. Non-
wage benefits in the private sector (primarily meal 
vouchers) are more than 10 per cent lower than 
level of payments observed last year. In addition, 
the widespread use of government wage 
compensation also contributed to a reduction in 
cost increases. Bonus payments at the end of the 
year will play a major role in determining the 
annual wage index. 
As a result of deteriorating productivity in the past 
few quarters and salary increases due to 
administrative measures, unit labour costs have 
risen. Cutbacks in non-wage benefits and the 
government wage compensation could only 
partially offset these impacts. The dynamics of 
labour cost per capita have almost increased back 
to the level observed during the years before the 
crisis, and this may result in an increase in cost-
side inflationary pressure in labour-intensive 
industries in particular (Charts 3-39). 
The gross average earning of those employed in 
the public sector declined in recent months. The 
main underlying reason is the composition effect 
stemming from the high number of employees in 
public work schemes. 
3.6.2 Producer prices 
Prices of agricultural products have been rising 
since the beginning of the year. In recent months, 
the significant increase in cereal prices and 
seasonal food prices contributed to the rise in 
producer prices (Charts 3-40). 
This year, unfavourable weather conditions 
affected developments in agricultural production 
not only in Hungary, but globally as well. 
Therefore, looking ahead, further producer price 
increases are expected, and this outlook is also 
supported by the high grain futures prices for the 
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Chart 3-41 Industrial producer prices (January 
2005 – October 2012) 
 
Chart 3-42 Decomposition of the consumer price 
index (January 2005 – November 2012) 
 
 
Chart 3-43  Developments in the consumer price 
index and core inflation excluding tax changes and 






The appreciation of the forint against the dollar 
and oil price adjustments resulted in a decline in 
producer prices in the power generation sectors. In 
the case of other sectors, as a result of world 
market price effects and the appreciation of the 
forint exchange rate, the dynamics of industrial 
prices have remained practically unchanged in 
recent months. At the same time, increasing price 
pressure is observed in the food processing 
sectors, in line with the higher commodity prices 
(Charts 3-41). 
3.6.3 Consumer prices 
Following the peak in September, the annual 
consumer price index decelerated to 6 per cent in 
October, and then to 5.2 per cent in November. 
This decline is mainly attributable to lower fuel 
prices and easing inflation in tradables. In recent 
months, the inflation figures have been even more 
favourable than the expectations of the central 
bank (Charts 3-42). 
Indirect tax increases at the beginning of the year 
and cost shocks (unprocessed food and fuel prices) 
continued to contribute strongly to the elevated 
inflation figures, which are also high by 
international comparison. Indicators of underlying 
inflation, which exclude these effects, paint a 
more favourable picture. Demand-sensitive 
inflation has decreased slightly since the middle of 
the year (Charts 3-43). While the indicator had 
previously been high by regional standards, the 
measures have dropped to levels consistent with 
that of low-inflation countries in the past few 
quarters, in line with the continuing decline in 
domestic demand (Charts 3-44). 
Tradables inflation in the past months was 
determined by the exchange rate, which was 
stronger than at the beginning of the year, and by 
weak demand. Durable goods prices continue to 
decline. This product group is characterised by 
subdued price developments, which may be 
explained by an environment of weak demand. The 
stronger forint exchange rate may have fed into 
the prices of non-durable goods as well; in 
addition, annual inflation in this category was also 
influenced by one-off factors (significant drop in 
airfares). 
Since February, monthly inflation in market 
services excluding tax changes has been more 
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Chart 3-44 Development of demand sensitive 
inflation in the region (Jan. 2008 – Oct. 2012) 
 
Chart 3-45 Tradables and market services inflation 
(Jan. 2005 – Nov. 2012) 
 
Chart 3-46 Range of underlying inflation indicators 




favourable, compared to the usual seasonality. As 
a result, the annual index of market services is 
historically low. The rise in the annual index for 
October was caused by base effects. The 
development of prices of market services may 
reflect the strong price-reducing effect of weak 
domestic demand. At the same time, it is 
important to note that services are rarely repriced 
at the end of the year. Therefore, the figures for 
the first months of next year may provide 
definitive information on the magnitude of the 
inflationary pressure in this segment (Charts 3-45). 
In line with producer prices, the prices of food 
products which are sensitive to cost shocks 
increased sharply in recent months. Changes in the 
prices of unprocessed food were affected by this 
year’s unfavourable weather, which led to 
significant rises in the prices of seasonal products 
(vegetables, fruits and potato). In the case of 
processed food, in addition to the rising producer 
price pressure, the previous quarter’s high level of 
fuel prices also contributes to the price increases. 
In spite of the increasing cost pressure, for the 
time being only a slight acceleration can be 
observed in consumer prices. Within this range of 
products, the prices of processed meat products 
have increased the most significantly to date. The 
slow feed-through of cost shocks indicates that the 
decline in household demand may constrain 
retailers’ pricing decisions in the food market as 
well. Nevertheless, as a result of raw food price 
increases, processed food price inflation may 
continue to rise in the coming months. 
The significant appreciation of the forint against 
the US dollar has resulted in a substantial decline 
in fuel prices in recent months. As during the 
whole year, regulated energy prices continue to 
be characterised by subdued price dynamics. 
Within pharmaceutical products, despite the 
reduction of price subsidies, prices of subsidised 
medicines increased to a lesser extent.5 The price 
increase stemming from the reduction of subsidies 
may have been partly offset by the new pricing 
mechanism (e.g. blind bidding) introduced at the 
beginning of the year. 
Overall, in the past period, it was mainly cost 
                                                 
5 Presumably, the reduction of subsidies will rather result in the withdrawal of the products concerned 
from the Hungarian market. 
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Chart 3-47 Households’ inflation expectations 
(January 2005 – November 2012)  
 
Source: MNB calculations based on data from the EU 
Commission. 
Chart 3-48 Expected changes in retail sales prices 
in the next 3 months* and actual inflation (January 
2005 – November 2012) 
 
*The balance is the difference between the proportions of 
corporations expecting price increase and price decrease. 
shocks (unprocessed food and fuel prices) which 
contributed to developments in inflation. At the 
same time, moderate price increases were 
observed in a wide range of products. Looking 
ahead, demand-side inflationary pressure may 
remain subdued in the coming months as well. 
Strong declines in fuel prices and a slowdown in 
unprocessed food price increases may result in 
improving developments in inflation over the short 
run. 
3.6.4 Inflation expectations 
Following a decline in the middle of the year, 
households’ inflation expectations increased 
(Charts 3-47). The higher commodity prices in 
recent months and the announced government 
measures may have also contributed to this 
increase. Despite the stronger exchange rate and 
the moderate increase in utility prices, 
households’ inflation perceptions continue to be at 
a high level. The uncertainty of perceptions 
related to the expected inflation environment also 
increased in accordance with the strong volatility 
of inflation seen in recent quarters. 
In terms of short-term prospective developments 
in consumer prices, the expectations of the retail 
trade sector regarding sales prices are a key 
factor. Following a mid-year increase, 
expectations declined slightly, which may indicate 
that the disinflationary effects of weak demand 
may continue to act as a strong constraint on the 
pricing decisions of the sector (Charts 3-48). 
 
Box 3-3 Effects of administrative wage increases on private sector wages 
The administrative wage increases (minimum wage increase and guaranteed wage minimum increase) 
which entered into force in 2012 contributed significantly to the increase in gross average earnings, both 
indirectly and directly. The measures resulted in a surge in the wage index, mainly for employees with 
low earnings. However, the wages of persons employed in higher earning categories not directly affected 
by the measures also increased, and the compensation provided by the government did not cover these 
wages. The measures render analysis of wage developments in 2012 more difficult, and therefore, the 
aforementioned effects are quantified in this box. 
We used the 2011 Wage Tariff Survey of the National Employment Service to estimate the direct effect. 
We calculated the size of the direct impact of the measures on the wage index on the basis of the 
number and the wage bill of employees who earn the minimum wage and the guaranteed wage minimum 
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in the private sector. Its value represents approximately 2.4 percentage points in the 2012 wage index of 
the private sector. 
Among those with high earnings, one possible reason for the feed-through effect is that companies strive 
to maintain the relationship between employees’ relative productivity and relative wages. In addition, 
another possible explanation is whitening (the reported wage bill approaches the real wage bill). In the 
aforementioned cases, when the wages of those who earn less are raised, the wages of those with higher 
earnings are also increased in order to maintain the differences across wages within the company (wage 
compression). Tightness may also be an alternative explanation for the second-round effect among 
employees with higher qualifications. Accordingly, the feed-through effects of administrative measures 
may explain around 1.1 percentage points of this year’s wage index, which may be considered an upper 
estimate due to the alternative explanation. This increase already appears in those earning categories 
that are not included in the wage compensation, i.e. at companies it appears in full as an increase in 
wage costs (Charts 3-49). 
According to our calculations, the 2012 wage index figure which excludes the administrative measures 
and better captures underlying wage developments is around 3.7 per cent. The second-round effect 
observed among employees with higher earnings is added to it. Accordingly, the effective wage cost 
increased by some 4–5 per cent, which can be considered high during a recession and requires 
adjustment. The adjustment could already be observed in the wage figures of recent months. 
Chart 3-49 Increase in gross average earnings at various wage levels in the private sector 
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4 FINANCIAL MARKETS AND LENDING 
4.1 Trends in the domestic financial market 
Since September 2012, improvements in the global investment environment and a one-off technical 
impact have led to a significant reduction in perceptions of Hungarian sovereign risk. This may reflect 
favourable developments in crisis management in the euro area as well as a broader quantitative easing 
policy of central banks. Apart from a few minor deviations, domestic risk premia followed global 
market trends. As regards domestic events, Hungary’s market perception was favourably influenced by 
the first fiscal adjustment package announced in early October, whereas the second package had a 
negative impact on Hungary’s market perception. The EUR/HUF exchange rate has responded mainly to 
global sentiment over the past three months; domestic events are only likely to have exerted a stronger 
impact for short periods. Similarly, Hungary’s downgrade in late November only exerted a temporary 
impact on the EUR/HUF exchange rate. CDS premia for Hungary also narrowed significantly, by close to 
80 basis points, although the country decoupled from regional trends in a negative direction during a 
certain part of the period under review. Benchmark yields on forint government securities also 
declined, while government securities held by non-residents reached another record high, rising above 
HUF 5,000 billion. This means that non-resident market participants account for 45 per cent of total 
holdings of forint-denominated Treasury bills and bonds. 
Chart 4-1 5-year sovereign credit default swap 
premia in the region 
 
Chart 4-2 Factors of domestic 5-year sovereign 
credit default swap premia 
 
Note: For a description of the employed decomposition methodology, 
see Kocsis-Nagy (2011) A decomposition of sovereign CDS premia. 
4.1.1 Risk perception of Hungary 
Improvements in the global investment environment 
and a one-off technical impact are the likely causes 
of the reduction in the perception of Hungarian 
sovereign risk over the past three months (for more 
information, see the Box 4-1). Over the period as a 
whole, country-specific factors have also been a 
positive contributor, although to a lesser extent. 
However, this favourable development did not 
materialise consistently: in the first half of October, 
similar to other countries in the region, perceptions 
of the Hungarian sovereign risk improved rapidly 
and markedly relative to the previous period. By 
contrast, CDS premia moved in the opposite 
direction between the second half of October and 
mid-November (Chart 4-1 and 4-2), when domestic 
instruments slightly underperformed the region. 
That said, there has been some improvement over 
the past one month. 
The improvement in the global environment 
reflected in part the outcome of crisis management 
in the euro area. Market tensions were eased by 
successful bond auctions in euro-area periphery 
countries, recent agreements on Greece and the 
lower-than-expected needs for recapitalisation of 
Spain’s banking system. Furthermore, enhancement 
of the quantitative easing programs of major central 
banks also contributed to the increase in global risk 
appetite. 
A more benign global sentiment led to a reduction 
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Chart 4-3 Changes in 5-year CDS premia in the 
region 
 
Chart 4-4 Premia on 5-year EUR-denominated 
bonds in the region 
 
Chart 4-5 Exchange rate developments in the 
region 
Note: Change relative to the start of the year. Positive values denote 
appreciation of regional currencies. 
 
in the risk premia on risky assets. Yields on the 
government securities and the CDS premia of euro-
area periphery countries narrowed, and in 
particular yields on Greek securities declined 
markedly. By early December, stock market indexes 
in developed markets had offset the slight decline 
experienced around the middle of the period, and 
for the period as a whole commodity prices declined 
modestly. 
Apart from a few minor deviations, domestic risk 
premia followed global market trends. Hungary’s 5-
year CDS premium dropped from 370 basis points at 
the beginning of the period to close to 290 basis 
points by the end. Before mid-October, the 
premium moved broadly together with the premia 
of other countries in the region with risks similar to 
Hungary, but it then subsequently started to 
decouple from them: whilst risk premia in Croatia 
and Romania were broadly flat in this period, 
premia in Hungary rose by 70 basis points by mid-
November, reaching a level of 320 basis points. 
However, there has been a slight decline over the 
past one month, with the domestic risk premium 
moving together with regional trends again (Charts 
4-3). 
As regards domestic events, the first fiscal 
adjustment package announced in early October 
was clearly well received by analysts. However, the 
second adjustment package had an opposite effect; 
it tended to worsen the market’s perceptions of 
Hungarian sovereign risk. This was further 
aggravated by the government’s conflicting 
communication regarding the IMF negotiations as 
well as the resultant negative analyst opinions. 
4.1.2 FX market trends 
The EUR/HUF exchange rate mainly responded to 
global sentiment over the past three months, and 
domestic events are likely to have exerted a 
stronger impact only for short periods. The 
exchange rate of the forint moved within a 
relatively narrow band, between EUR/HUF 277 and 
EUR/HUF 286 in the period. Regarding domestic 
events, it was mainly the news of the measures 
aimed at reducing the deficit announced in early 
and mid-October and the related communication 
that had a significant impact. At that juncture, 
there was a shift in the positive direction in the 
exchange rate of the forint relative to the Polish 
zloty serving as a benchmark; in early November, 
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Chart 4-7 Net HUF-FX swap contracts held by non-
residents and cumulative HUF purchases made by 
non-residents 
 











the two currencies started to move closely with 
each other again. Although the market continued to 
respond to news about the IMF negotiations, it only 
triggered smaller swings in the forint exchange rate. 
In addition, Hungary’s downgrading in late 
November also only had a temporary impact on the 
EUR/HUF exchange rate; likewise, worse-than-
expected GDP data only mildly affected the 
exchange rate (Charts 4-5). 
However, forward-looking risk indicators calculated 
from FX market option prices failed to reveal a 
clear picture in the period: aside from a few minor 
shifts, the indicator implying the probability of 
forint depreciation remained fundamentally 
unchanged; by contrast, one-month implied 
volatility dropped by over 3 per cent, suggesting 
less uncertainty (Charts 4-6). 
Trading on the domestic FX swap market was calm 
for most of the past period, but tensions were 
palpable at end-Q3 and towards year-end, probably 
in relation to a temporary clean-up of balance 
sheets. Some market participants sold their short-
term forint assets temporarily at the end of 
September and placed their resulting forint liquidity 
in the domestic FX swap market, which led to a 
reduction in implied forint yields on short-term 
trades. The trends seen in late September were less 
dramatic than the end-June tensions, which are 
likely to have had a similar root cause. Approaching 
the end of the year, there has been a reduction in 
implied yields on contracts maturing next year (first 
over the 3-month horizon, then over the 2-month 
horizon, and finally over the one-month horizon). 
Tensions have built up at shorter maturities as well, 
which increases the likelihood of a repetition of the 
turbulence seen late last year. In order to ease 
these tensions the central bank of Hungary 
introduced an FX-swap tender offering euro liquidity 
to Hungarian banks. 
Relative to the start of the period, the net FX swap 
stock held by the non-resident sector grew by HUF 
80 billion, which was the outcome of a significant 
reduction in the two gross stocks. Concurrently, 
forint purchases by non-resident participants rose 
by close to HUF 100 billion (Chart 4-7). There were 
strong fluctuations in holdings of MNB bonds by non-
residents during this period. 
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Chart 4-9 Trends in benchmark yields in the 




4.1.3 The government securities market 
and yields 
The role of HUF-based financing continued to 
increase over the period, and while there has been 
no FX-denominated issuance by the Hungarian state, 
the issuances of primary government HUF securities 
have strong appeal for investors. Securities were 
sold against a backdrop of sizeable excess demand 
and consistently declining yields at most of the 
discount Treasury Bill and bond auctions arranged 
by the Government Debt Management Agency 
(GDMA). The GDMA increased the accepted amount 
relative to what had been announced on a number 
of occasions. On the other hand, as there was less 
interest in some issuances, the announced amount 
had to be reduced. Market interest was the keenest 
in medium- and long-term government bonds; by 
contrast, demand was lower than earlier for 3-
month auctions, especially in the second half of the 
period. 
The stock of government securities held by non-
residents continued to grow from mid-September 
onwards: following the net purchase of nearly HUF 
265 billion by the sector, their total holding had 
reached another record high, rising above HUF 
5,000 billion (Chart 4-8). This means that non-
resident market participants’ holdings amount to 45 
per cent of the entire stock of forint-denominated 
Treasury Bills and bonds. The average remaining 
maturity of the government securities held by non-
residents dropped to 3.8 years in the period. 
The GDMA started to sell the Prémium Euró Magyar 
Államkötvény (Premium Euro Hungarian Government 
Bond) series to domestic agents in mid-November, 
with EUR 200 million as an initial limit amount, 
which can be raised later if appropriate. In the third 
week into the distribution a total of EUR 130 million 
was sold mainly to residents. 
According to government’s communications, the 
Hungarian State plans to issue an FX-denominated 
government bond in the first quarter of 2013. The 
recent issuance by Eximbank – which can be 
regarded as a kind of test run – was successful, 
though the yields were 200-220 basis points higher 
than the Hungarian sovereign dollar bonds. 
Yields on government securities declined at all 
maturities. In respect of the short-end of the yield 
curve, there was a nearly 90-100 basis point decline 
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in yields on 3-, 6- and 12-month Treasury Bills, 
roughly, in line with expectations for the central 
bank base rate. There was a lower, 60-80 basis 
point decline on longer-term securities. The yield 
on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years 
thus dropped to approximately 6.5 per cent, the 
lowest level in the last 2.5 years (Charts 4-9). 
Risk premia on FX bonds changed to a lesser degree: 
those on longer-term euro bonds declined by 25 to 
50 basis points; by contrast, those on US dollar 
bonds widened by 20 to 30 basis points. 
FRA prices reflecting interest expectations also fell 
in the money market, suggesting that the market is 
pricing in further gradual cuts in the base rate. 
Expectations suggested by current market quotes 
are for an approximately 5 per cent trough in the 
interest cycle at the end of next summer. 
 
Box 4-1 Impact of the regulation governing uncovered European sovereign CDS deals on CDS 
premia 
The regulation governing the ban on uncovered European sovereign CDS positions entered into force in 
the EU on 1 November 2012. The overall purpose of the EU regulation is to harmonise at a community 
level the measures taken by the individual member states by means of a consolidated and consistent 
regulatory framework. The regulation bans uncovered short-term share and sovereign bond deals as well 
as CDS transactions concluded for purposes other than hedging. 
What are the most important issues governed by the regulation? 
 It standardises the definition of short and long positions in shares and sovereign bonds. 
 It defines the meaning of uncovered positions in the case of sovereign CDS. 
 It stipulates a reporting obligation for sizeable net short positions in shares and sovereign bonds. 
 It imposes limitations on uncovered short-term share and sovereign bond deals and CDS transactions. 
 It designates the authorities with competence in respect of the measures set out in the regulation 
and sets out the remit of interventions by the individual authorities and the European Securities 
Markets Authority (ESMA). 
 It identifies the participants and situations exempt from the ban (market makers, primary market 
operations and securities the principal market of which is outside the EU) as well as the guidelines 
according to which the individual authorities can decide on a temporary suspension of limitations. 
Before the regulation entered into force, the obligation to unwind existing positions had already 
significantly reduced premia (the CEEMEA SovX6 had dropped from 240 basis points to 180 basis points by 
late October; the reduction was due mostly to a sharp fall in the premia for the EU member states 
affected by the regulation). Some experts expected distortions in pricing in respect of the period after 1 
                                                 
6 CEEMEA SovX is a composite index derived from the 15 most liquid sovereign credit default swaps for 
emerging Europe, the Middle East and Africa. 
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November as a response to the drying-up of the market. An increasingly large number of analyses pointed 
out that that CDS premia on EU sovereigns had become a less reliable-than-earlier measure of risk 
perceptions. 
In addition to more optimistic market sentiment, this recently adopted regulation has also contributed to 
a marked fall in the CDS premia of the CEE member states of the EU over the short term. Hungary’s risk 
premia declined by 185 basis points in September and October, in line with regional trends: in Romania 
and Croatia, where premia were similar to Hungary’s, they fell by 185 and 200 basis points, respectively. 
This reduction in the premia of the region came to a halt by the second half of October, and the CDS 
premia of the CEE member states of the EU started to move closely with premia in other regions again. 
However, this materialised slightly differently in Hungary: CDS premia for Hungary rose to 320 basis 
points by mid-November, and then started to fall gradually, moving in line with the CDS premia in other 
countries in the region. Such temporary departure from regional trends and the CDS decomposition 
methodology intending to quantify it (see Chart 4-2) probably suggest that the increase can be attributed 
country-specific factors rather than adjustments for an earlier technical impact. 
 
4.2 Interest rate conditions in the financial intermediary system 
According to the Lending Survey,7 in the household segment a further adjustment took place following 
broad-based tightening, while tightening continued in the corporate segment. Interest rates on HUF-
denominated corporate loans declined markedly, whereas those on EUR loans declined slightly between 
July and October 2012, but due to strict non-price conditions, only a narrower range of companies may 
benefit from the more favourable forint interest rates. Within the household segment, only the annual 
percentage rate of charge (APR) on housing mortgage loans dropped, while the interest rate and the 
interest rate spread remain at high levels. The APR on home equity loans did not change in the past 
quarter, while an increase was observed in the case of unsecured consumer loans. The one-year real 
interest rate dropped to a historical low as a result of the decline in government securities yields and 
deposit rates as well as of an increase in inflation expectations. 
 
Chart 4-10 Interest rates on corporate loans by 
denomination
 
Note: 3-month moving average of monthly interest rate data. 
Source: MNB. 
4.2.1 Credit conditions of corporate loans 
Based on transactions, the interest rate on 
corporate forint loans smoothed by the 3-month 
moving average declined from 9.8 per cent in July 
to 9.3 per cent in October (Chart 4-10). This took 
place in parallel with a similar decline in the 
interbank rate (3-month BUBOR). Following the 
rise observed during 2012, the smoothed spread 
over the interbank rate slightly declined in the 
autumn, from 2.6 percentage points to 2.5 
percentage points (Chart 4-11), which is the 
average level of the past two years. 
In the case of EUR-denominated loans, the interest 
rate level declined slightly, from 3.5 per cent to 
3.4 per cent. In the meantime, the interbank rate 
(3-month EURIBOR) fell to a greater extent, and 
thus the interest rate spread increased to 3.1 
                                                 
7 http://english.mnb.hu/Root/Dokumentumtar/ENMNB/Penzugyi_stabilitas/hitelezesi_felmeres/201211/SLO_201211_en.pdf  
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Chart 4-11 Interest rate spreads on corporate 
loans by denomination
 
Note: The spread on the moving average of the 3-month BUBOR 





Chart 4-12 Annual percentage rate (APR) on 
forint-based housing and consumer loans 
 
Note: Interest rates smoothed by the 3-month moving average. 
HSLA stands for home savings and loan associations. Prior to 




percentage points by October (Chart 4-11). 
According to the Lending Survey, corporate credit 
conditions tightened further in 2012 Q3. A net 22 
per cent of banks8 indicated tightening, in relation 
to a wide range of conditions. Similarly to the 
survey of the previous quarter, responding banks 
mainly cited unfavourable economic prospects and 
industry-specific problems as factors contributing 
to tightening. Based on banks’ responses, no 
further tightening is expected in corporate credit 
conditions in the coming half year. However, no 
easing can be expected either, so the current tight 
conditions may continue to prevail. 
Both the Lending Survey and the interest rate 
statistics of transactions carried out are needed 
for the assessment of enterprises’ credit market 
circumstances. The Lending Survey shows 
developments in credit supply constraints, which 
determine whether the given company is 
creditworthy, whereas the interest rate statistics 
contain the conditions for companies that proved 
to be creditworthy. Overall, due to the tight credit 
conditions, only a narrower range of enterprises 
may benefit from the more favourable interest 
rates. 
4.2.2 Credit conditions of household loans 
In the case of housing mortgage loan transactions, 
the annual percentage rate of charge (APR) 
smoothed by the three-month moving average 
declined somewhat compared to the previous 
quarter, from 12.1 per cent in July to 11.8 per 
cent (Chart 4-12). The interest rate spread and 
interest rate of traditional commercial bank 
transactions (excluding home savings and loan 
associations), which have a significant weight in 
new lending, are roughly 1 percentage point higher 
than that. In parallel with a decline in the 
reference interest rate, the interest rate spread 
over the BUBOR remained unchanged at around 5 
percentage points (Chart 4-13). It may have played 
a significant role in the decline in the interest rate 
that since the introduction of transparent pricing 
the schemes tied to a reference interest rate 
represent a considerable weight in new lending. 
Nevertheless, interest rates and interest rate 
                                                 
8 The difference between tightening and easing banks weighted by market share. The ratio does not show the magnitude of 
tightening/easing. 
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Chart 4-13 Interest rate spreads over the 3-month 
BUBOR 
 
Note: Spreads smoothed by the 3-month moving average. HSLA 
stands for home savings and loan associations. Prior to 2009 
HUF-denominated mortgage lending was marginal. Source: 
MNB. 
 
Chart 4-14 Changes in credit conditions in the 
household segment 
 
Note: Net percentage balance of respondents reporting 
tightening/easing credit conditions weighted by market share. 








spreads are at historically high levels. In the case 
of housing loans, the state interest rate subsidy 
may result in some decline in the high interest 
rate level. Accordingly, the client’s interest 
burden may be around 8–9 per cent for five years.9 
Within consumer loans, no decline was perceived 
in the case of home equity loans; the APR 
continues to be around the level of 15 per cent. 
The declining reference interest rate was offset by 
an increase in the spread, which exceeded 8 
percentage points. This behaviour, which is 
different from that of housing loans, may be 
attributable to the very strong concentration 
typical of the segment. Following a decline in 2012 
Q2, smoothed APR data on unsecured consumer 
loans increased slightly, from 27.7 per cent in 
June to 28.6 per cent in October. The increase was 
mainly attributable to hire purchase loans. 
In the Lending Survey, nearly a net 20 per cent of 
banks reported that they had eased credit 
conditions of housing loans and 9 per cent in the 
case of consumer loans in 2012 Q3. Accordingly, 
adjustment continued following the tightening 
observed at end-2011. Based on expectations for 
the coming half year, further adjustment may only 
take place in consumer loans. 
4.2.3 Developments in real interest rates 
Since the previous Quarterly Report on Inflation, 
the one-year real interest rate calculated on the 
basis of government securities yields declined 
considerably, from 2.6 per cent in July 2012 to 1.4 
per cent in October (Chart 4-15). The change was 
partly attributable to the continuing decrease in 
the one-year government securities yield, and 
partly to an increase in inflation expectations. The 
real interest rate calculated from deposit rates 
with maturities of up to one year also declined 
from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent in the period 
under review. The October level of the real 
interest rate can be considered historically low. 
                                                 
9 It is important to mention that the future upswing in the interest rate subsidy will only be seen in the volume of new lending; it 
will not appear in the interest rate levels reported by banks, because they report the interest rates together with the interest rate 
subsidy to the MNB. 
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Chart 4-15 Forward-looking real interest rates 
 
Note: * Based on the one-year forward-looking inflation 
expectations of analysts calculated by the MNB using the 1-
year zero coupon yields and the Reuters poll.  
** Based on one-year forward-looking inflation expectations of 
analysts calculated by the MNB using bank deposit rates with 
maturity up to 1 year (corporate and household weighted) and 
the Reuters poll. 
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5 BALANCE POSITION OF THE ECONOMY 
5.1 External balance and financing 
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian economy continued to increase in 2012 Q2. The 
increase was mainly attributable to the growing surplus on the balance of goods and services, while the 
lower-than-expected inflow of EU transfers was reflected in the more moderate increase in the transfer 
balance. Our preliminary data suggest that the increase in the external surplus may have continued in 
Q3 as well. In parallel with the massive external financing surplus, the outflow of foreign funds 
continued. In the last quarters the decline in debt type liabilities was mainly related to the banking 
sector. As a result of the outflow of funds, by the end of Q2, Hungary’s gross and net external debt 
indicators declined to the level observed immediately prior to the crisis. 
 
Chart 5-1 Changes in external financing capacity 





Chart 5-2 Structure of external financing 




5.1.1 Developments in the external 
balance of Hungary 
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian 
economy rose to a historic peak (3.6 per cent of 
GDP) in 2012 Q2, and according to our preliminary 
data the increase in the trade surplus may have 
continued in Q3 as well. This increase was mainly 
attributable to the growing surplus on the balance 
of goods and services, while the slightly higher 
deficit on the income balance was offset by a 
marginally higher surplus on the transfer balance 
(Charts 5-1). 
The improvement in the balance of goods and 
services continued to reflect the duality that is 
typical of the Hungarian economy. Weak domestic 
demand (consumption and investment) resulted in 
low imports, while – partly as a result of the pick-
up in automotive production – the growth rate of 
exports slightly exceeded that of imports, despite 
the slowdown in external economic activity.  
At the same time, the inflow of EU transfers fell 
short of our expectations. In H1, a mere EUR 1.2 
billion appeared on the transfer balance, 
compared to EUR 1.5 billion in the same period 
last year. The lower inflow represents a risk in 
terms of the fulfilment of our forecast for the 
external financing capacity of the economy, as we 
expect higher EU transfer inflows for this year 
compared to last year. 
5.1.2 Developments in financing 
As opposed to the low inflow of funds in Q1, a 
decline in the external funds of the economy was 
observed in Q2, which may have continued in Q3 
as well, according to our preliminary data (Charts 
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Chart 5-3 Breakdown of net external debt by 
sectors (values as a proportion of GDP) 
 
 
Chart 5-4 Short-term external debt (according to 




In Q2, the data of the financial account showed a 
considerable outflow of funds, which was almost 
entirely related to the decline in debt-type 
external liabilities. At the same time, the 
structure of the decline in debt was different from 
the one observed in previous quarters. For one 
year starting from the beginning of 2011, in 
parallel with a decline in the banking sector’s 
external funds, the external debt of the general 
government increased slightly. At the same time, 
the external debt of banks and the state remained 
unchanged in 2012 Q2, while the corporate sector 
reduced its debt. According to the available 
preliminary bank data, the decline in the external 
debt of the banking sector accelerated again in 
Q3. 
The means that the adjustment process following 
the outbreak of the crisis has continued, resulting 
in a decline in the external indebtedness of the 
Hungarian economy. With regard to external debt, 
the private sector (mainly the banking sector and 
to a lesser extent the corporate sector) is reducing 
its external liabilities to a greater extent than the 
general government. As a result, net external debt 
as a proportion of GDP fell to 47 per cent from the 
level about 50 per cent we perceived at the end of 
2011, while gross debt declined from 115 per cent 
to 101 per cent, levels which are still considered 
high in international comparison, but correspond 
to the levels observed right before the crisis 
(Charts 5-3). According to our preliminary data, 
the decline in external debt may have continued in 
Q3, which may have been supported by the 
appreciating forint exchange rate, in addition to 
the outflow of funds. In addition to the decline in 
total debt, it is a favourable development that the 
maturity structure of external debt also improved 
in Q2. Short-term debt, which is of key importance 
in terms of vulnerability, declined considerably in 
this period (Charts 5-4). 
5.2 Forecast for Hungary’s external balance position 
The external financing capacity of Hungary may continue to rise in the coming years, which is mainly 
attributable to the steadily growing surplus on the balance of goods and services. Following the 
increase, the growth in Hungary’s external financing capacity may stop at around 7 per cent in 2014. It 
is primarily the further increase in the savings of the corporate sector which will contribute to the high 
external financing capacity. Households’ savings will decline marginally, and the low deficit of the 
general government this year may increase in 2013, which may be followed by a stagnation in 2014. If 
our forecast is fulfilled, the external financing capacity of Hungary may be among the highest in the 
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European Union in 2013 and 2014, and at the same time Hungary may prove to be one of the Member 
States that achieves the largest improvement compared to the pre-crisis level. Hungary’s growing 
external surplus is also reflected in the expected improvement in the country’s external debt and 
liability indicators. 
Chart 5-5 Changes in external financing capacity 
(as a proportion of GDP; 2004 – 2014) 
 
*The sum of current transfers and the capital account 
balance. 
Chart 5-6 Changes in financing capacities of 
sectors (as a proportion of GDP, 2004 – 2014) 
 
*In addition to the central government, the augmented 
general government includes local governments, ÁPV Ltd., 
institutions discharging quasi-fiscal duties (MÁV, BKV), the 
MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated 
and controlled by the government but formally implemented 
under PPP schemes. The augmented SNA deficit takes into 
The external financing capacity of the Hungarian 
economy may continue to increase this year, and 
this process may continue in the coming two years 
as well. At the same time, compared to the 
September issue of the Quarterly Report on 
Inflation, our expectations concerning the 
improvement in Hungary’s external balance 
position in 2012 have declined somewhat, due 
mainly to the change in the transfer balance. 
The surplus of goods and services increased this 
year to around 8 per cent as a proportion of GDP 
and may continue to grow in the coming years, 
reflecting – in addition to the still weak domestic 
demand factors and the growing external demand 
– the export-increasing effect of the automotive 
investment projects that are launching production 
(Charts 5-5). 
Although this year’s inflows of EU transfers were 
well below our expectations and this reduced our 
forecast as well, the transfer balance may 
continue to significantly contribute to the high 
financing surplus in the coming years.10 As a result 
of the expected persistently low international 
interest rate environment and the declining 
external debt, no major change is expected in the 
deficit on the income balance until end-2014. 
Examining the developments in the external 
balance through the changes in the savings of 
domestic sectors, it can be concluded that in 2012 
and 2013 the continued increase in Hungary’s 
external surplus is primarily determined by the 
rising savings of the corporate sector, while 
households’ savings declined slightly, and the 
financing requirement of the general government 
may increase to a lesser extent in 2013.11 We 
expect stabilising developments for 2014: without 
                                                 
10 At the same time, a declining transfer balance is expected for 2014, mainly due to the beginning of the 
new EU budget period. 
11 The financing position of the general government and the private sector was affected by a number of 
one-off factors in 2011. The statistical settlement of the private pension fund scheme, the disbursement 
of real yields, the VAT refunded to companies as a result of a European Court decision and the change in 
the personal income tax system all added to the private sector’s income, a considerable portion of which 
was channelled into savings. 
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account private pension savings. **Net financing capacity of 
households consistent with the SNA deficit does not contain 
the pension savings of those who return to the public 
pension system. The official financing capacity (shown in the 
financial account) is different from the data in the chart. 
 
Chart 5-7 Pre-crisis financing capacity and the 
changes in external financing capacity expected 
in the coming years in EU Member States (as a 
proportion of GDP; averages of 2003 – 2007 and 
2012 – 2014) 
 
Chart 5-8 Expected developments in net 
external liabilities and debt (as a proportion of 
GDP; 2004 – 2013) 
 
further measures, the general government SNA-
type deficit may remain stable, while we do not 
expect significant change in the net savings 
position of the household and corporate sector 
(Charts 5-6). 
According to the European Commission’s autumn 
forecast, as a result of the continued improvement 
in Hungary’s external balance position, following 
the Netherlands, Hungary will have the highest net 
financing capacity by 2014. In addition, examining 
the developments over a longer period of time, it 
can also be concluded that among the EU Member 
States the most significant external balance 
improvement compared to the pre-crisis level is 
also expected to take place in Hungary. At the 
same time, it is also important to add that the 
improvement in the external balance position was 
also coupled with a considerable drop in domestic 
demand (Charts 5-7). 
The growing external surplus also results in a 
decline in stock indicators.12 According to our 
forecast, both Hungary’s external liabilities and, 
within that, Hungary’s external debt may decline 
considerably in the coming years. By end-2013, 
Hungary’s net external debt, which is extremely 
high in international comparison at present, may 
sink close to 35 per cent of GDP, i.e. close to the 
European average. However, it still exceeds the 
average of countries at a similar level of 
development. The decline in Hungary’s external 
indebtedness continues to be mainly attributable 
to the continued adjustment of the private sector 
(banking system and corporate sector) (Charts 5-
8). 
 
5.3 Fiscal developments 
The measures announced in recent months may result in a considerable improvement in the 2013 fiscal 
balance. Despite these measures, the deficit – which is expected to be near the government’s target in 
                                                 
12 In the past quarters, the cumulative error of the balance of payments (Net errors and omissions, NEO) 
declined considerably, as a result which our forecast for financing data also already indicates external 
fund outflows similar to the real economy forecast and thus a stronger-than-earlier decline in external 
liabilities and debt. 
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2012 – may increase to 3 per cent of GDP in 2013, even if the budgeted reserves of 1.4 per cent of GDP 
are cancelled. In 2014, however, the deficit may significantly exceed the 3 per cent threshold value, 
which is attributable, inter alia, to the planned pay rise of teachers and the deficit effect of the MNB’s 
loss. In terms of longer-term developments in the deficit, it should be noted that by 2014 government 
investment may decline to an extremely low level, falling well behind the replacement needs of fixed 
assets. Also taking account of the tax effect, the increasing of investment, which is unavoidable in the 





Chart 5-9 General government balance indicators 











5.3.1 The demand effect of fiscal policy 
Based on estimated fiscal impulses, considerable 
fiscal tightening is expected in 2012 and 2013, 
which may be followed by a stimulatory fiscal 
policy in 2014 (Charts 5-9).13 
A considerable demand reduction exceeding 2 per 
cent of GDP is observed in 2012. However, one half 
of this is related to the temporary expenditures of 
last year (pension fund real returns, the effect of 
the lost VAT case). The remaining part is 
proportionately distributed across the restraining 
of purchases, the raising of indirect taxes and 
measures that directly reduce the income of the 
private sector. 
Fiscal policy may be slightly expansionary in 2013 
as a result of various measures of opposite impact, 
leading to both intra- and inter-sectoral 
reallocations. 
In contrast to earlier announcements, special crisis 
taxes will not be temporary: while special sectoral 
taxes will be cancelled, special surcharges on 
banks will remain in place and the total tax burden 
of the energy sector will be substantially higher. 
The financial transaction fee and the electronic 
road toll will increase the financial burden borne 
by enterprises and households. Although the Job 
Protection Plan reduces enterprises’ tax burden, 
the overall impact of the measures announced in 
2012 represent a tax increase which will be 
reflected in the sectors expected revenue as well. 
Fiscal policy will, at the same, increase household 
                                                 
13 The fiscal impulse is approximated by the shift in the augmented (SNA) primary balance. For the sake 
of the impulse calculation, the augmented (SNA) deficit is a cash-based one, which is adjusted according 
to the accrual basis approach only in justified cases. The deficit is adjusted for various forms of quasi-
fiscal activities, such as the financing requirement of MÁV (Hungarian State Railways) and BKV (Budapest 
Public Transport Company), PPP projects and spreadable capital revenues (private pension, concession), 
because they are excluded from the ESA adjustments. The change in the primary balance, i.e. the one 
excluding interest expenditures and the profit/loss of the central bank, is taken into account in the fiscal 
impulse. 
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Table 5-1 General government balance indicators* 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
* Complete cancellation of the reserves serving the purpose of 
ensuring the balance target was assumed upon calculation of 






Table 5-2 Estimated effect of measures 
announced following publication of the September 
issue of the Quarterly Report on Inflation (HUF 
billion) 
** Of which HUF 73 billion is a temporary effect, because the 






income: in addition to the termination of the “half 
supergrossing “ of the personal income tax, high 
pension indexation will also compensate the 
household sector for the cancellation of the ceiling 
on employee pension contributions.14 
In 2014, fiscal policy may remain mildly 
expansionary., One element of this is the increase 
of teachers’ salaries which is expected to add 0.5 
per cent of GDP to households’ disposable income 
in net terms. 
5.3.2 Development of general government 
balance indicators 
Our 2012 fiscal forecast has barely changed since 
September. As a result of macroeconomic and 
fiscal developments and the measures affecting 
this year (blocking), the deficit declined to 2.7 per 
cent (Table 5-1).15 
Deficit reducing measures in relation to 2013 were 
announced in several steps in recent months. In 
addition, we also re-estimated the effect of 
earlier measures. Accordingly, our rule-based 
forecast improved by a total HUF 319 billion, i.e. 
1.1 per cent of GDP (Table 5.2). 
The deficit reduction in 2013 is mainly attributable 
to revenue-side measures which will either 
maintan or increase enterprises’current taxes. At 
the same time, the net (excluding tax content) 
impact of expenditures-side measures is 
approximately zero. A temporary expenditure 
reduction of 0.2 per cent of GDP is expected from 
delaying teachers’ salary increase, but this is 
offset by the permanent increases in expenditures 
(e.g. pharmaceutical subsidies). 
Regarding the planned and expected effects of the 
measures, the greatest difference can be 
identified in relation to the financial transaction 
tax and the efficiency of tax collection. 
In terms of its amount, the change in the financial 
transaction duty is the measure that has the 
greatest effect. Based on the analysis of micro 
                                                 
14 The increase in pension benefits’ real value is attributable to the indexation prescribed in the budget 
act which exceeds the rate of inflation. 
15 The September Inflation Report assumed that – in line with the government’s declared intentions – a 
significant adjustment would take place in order to reduce the 2013 deficit: our hypothetical scenario 
included, therefore, an adjustment equal to 1.4 percent of GDP. The measures announced since 
September actually reduce the deficit by 1.1 percent of GDP. 
2012 2013 2014
ESA deficit 2,7 3,0 3,8
Augmented (SNA) deficit 2,9 3,5 3,6
Cyclical component (MNB) 0,4 0,5 0,4
Cyclically-adjusted augmented (SNA) balance 2,5 3,0 3,2
memo: ESA deficit in 2012 September 
inflation report, assuming hypothetical 
adjustment 2,8 2,4 n.a.
2013
1. Revenue increasing measure 1,3
2. Revenue reduction (gambling tax, lower 
excise tax increase) 
-0,2
3. Expenditure reduction (without tax and 
contribution content)*
0,2
4. Expenditure increasing measure 
(without tax and contribution content)
-0,2
5. Total (1+2-3+4) 1,1
































data, total revenue of HUF 197 billion is expected 
from the private sector, whereas in the case of the 
Hungarian State Treasury the total balance 
improving revenue is estimated to amount to HUF 
20 billion. 
The budget expects significant revenue from 
improving the efficiency of tax collection. Our 
rule-based forecast only takes into account 
sufficiently detailed additional revenues whose 
effect can be estimated, e.g. the reverse VAT to 
be introduced. 
In summary, the substantial revenue shortfall (in 
comparison with the budget) may be offset by the 
National Protection Fund, equal to 1.4 per cent of 
GDP. Our projections are based on the assumption 
that these reserves will be cancelled. 
Our rule-based forecast is based on 
announcements made so far and indicates that the 
2014 deficit will be substantially above 3 per cent 
of GDP. The government’s commitment to 
reducing the deficit may indicate that further 
fiscal measures can be expected in the future. The 
uncertainties surrounding the size, composition 
and timing of such measures, however, prevents us 
from incorporating a hypothetical adjustment into 
our forecast. 
The deterioration in the balance projected for 
2014 is primarily the result of teachers’ pay rises, 
the disappearance of one-off property revenues 
(concession16) and the settlement of the central 
bank loss (see Box 5-1).  
The balance is improved by the whole-year effect 
of the e-road toll. A further decline in deficit 
amounting to 0.2 per cent of GDP is caused by 
minor items, such as decreases in housing subsidy, 
fare subsidy, EU payment and honouring of 
guarantees. 
The decline in EU support is fully reflected by the 
fall in material and investment expenditures. 
As opposed to the surge in the ESA deficit in 2014, 
a gradual deterioration is observed in 
developments in the augmented (SNA) deficit and 
the cyclically adjusted SNA deficit. Namely, these 
indicators show the 2013 central bank loss already 
in 2013. 
                                                 
16 We assumed that the concession related to the frequency will appear in 2013, instead of 2012. 







Chart 5-10 Gross public debt at constant, end-
2011 exchange rate (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
The level of the cyclically adjusted indicator is 
more favourable, as it takes into account that the 
tax revenue corresponding to 0.4–0.5 per cent of 
GDP will improve the balance in the medium term. 
However, it does not contain the additional 
expenditure that is unavoidable in the medium 
term and stems from the fact that by 2014 
investment will already fall short of the 
replacement need of fixed assets by 1 per cent of 
GDP, and all this – also taking account of the 
impact on taxes – may impair the balance by 0.6–
0.7 per cent. 
Our forecast is surrounded by significant risks in 
2013 and 2014. Unfavourable court decisions 
(communications sector surtax) may result in 
additional expenditures, and additional revenues 
may originate from an increase in the efficiency of 
tax collection, where, as a rule, only the measures 
that can be priced were taken into account. 
5.3.3 Expected development of public 
debt 
Assuming that the current foreign exchange rate 
remains flat on the forecast horizon, the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio may decrease from 81.4 percent 
at the end of last year to 77 percent in 2012, 
mainly due to the appreciation of HUF exchange 
rate. Regardless of the 3 percent deficit in 2013, 
the debt ratio is not likely to continue to 
decrease, because of the relatively modest growth 
in nominal GDP. Despite assuming the cancellation 
of the free reserves in the budget in each year, 
the deficit and growth forecast project a slight 
increase of the debt ratio in 2014 (Charts 5-10). 
Two factors have reduced the expected debt path 
since our previous forecast. First, of the debt of 
local governments with less than 5,000 
inhabitants, the central government intends to 
prepay HUF 100 billion in December 2012. Second, 
the significant amount of foreign currency 
borrowing planned for 2012 did not take place, 
and the foreign currency borrowing that fails to 
materialise is only partly substituted by the 
introduction of the currency bond for households 
and increased borrowing in forints. Accordingly, 
both debt and the government’s financing reserves 
may be lower than previously assumed. 
One technical factor influencing this outlook is 
that we now project the FX debt based on the 
current forint exchange rate, which significantly 
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lowered the level of public debt. On the other 
hand, the decrease in nominal GDP increased the 
debt path over the entire forecast horizon. 
The financing reserve available for the government 
originates mainly from the unused portion of the 
IMF-EU loan and the private pension fund 
portfolio; it declined in the past period, and is also 
lower than previously expected in our projection. 
This is partly attributable to the factors that 
reduce debt as well, such as the currency bond 
issue that will not take place and the partial 
prepayment of local government debt. On the 
other hand, acquisition of the E.ON Group’s 
natural gas industry interests will also reduce 
reserves, which will not influence gross debt, but 
will limit the assets available for debt reduction. 
Using the remaining reserves, it will be possible to 
reduce government debt by a further 2–2.5 per 
cent of GDP by the end of the period. However, as 
a result of the increase in financing risks in the 
crisis period, the raising of reserves is a more 
typical trend in the neighbouring countries. 
 
Box 5-1 Expected trends in central bank P&l 
The significant rise in central bank losses expected to materialise in 2013 will adversely affect the 2014 
fiscal deficit. The central bank’s P&L is mainly subject to monetary policy objectives and selected 
instruments as well as domestic and global economic trends. The objective of the MNB as set forth in the 
Central Bank Act is to achieve price stability; therefore, in implementing monetary policy, it cannot be 
driven by developments in central bank P&L (Charts 5-8). 
A rise in the losses incurred by the MNB is associated with the fact that FX reserves have been rising 
steeply since the onset of the crisis. In a global situation characterised by uncertainty at the outbreak of 
the crisis Hungary was only able to finance itself with the FX loan borrowed from the IMF/EU. As state 
expenditure was denominated in forint, the state converted the foreign currency it had received as a 
loan into forint with the MNB. As a result, FX reserves grew on the asset side of the central bank’s 
balance sheet and so did the state’s forint deposits on the liabilities side. In response to disbursements 
by the state, liquidity rose in the economy. Banks channelled this increased liquidity to the MNB in the 
form of two-week bills. Thus, the FX loan borrowed by the state led to an increase in central bank 
reserves and a rapid rise in the stock of MNB bills. The increase in FX reserves was also in line with non-
resident investors’ expectations stemming from a rise in the country’s short-term external debt and 
increased distrust; but for such increased reserves, the economy could not have been financed or only 
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Chart 5-11 Trends in central bank P&L 
 
The reason why high FX reserves hurt interest income is that the central bank is paid euro interest on FX 
reserves, but it pays interest on the MNB bills placed with it at the key policy rate, which is higher than 
the euro interest rate. A higher base rate was justified by high risk premia charged due to the 
uncertainty surrounding Hungarian assets as well as the intention to achieve the inflation target. 
Although the rise in FX reserves materialised in 2008 and 2009, massive interest losses originating from 
the structure of the central bank’s balance sheet and higher HUF interest triggered by higher risk premia 
have not led to significant central bank losses over the past years. Fundamentally, this is attributable to 
two factors: 
 One is that the central bank sold foreign currency to banks in order to avoid extreme exchange 
rate fluctuations in response to the early repayments of FX loans. As the exchange rate of the euro 
in the market during the sale was higher than the average buying rate of the FX reserves, the MNB 
earned approximately HUF 100 billion in exchange rate gains in the course of the early repayment 
programme. 
 The other factor that mitigated losses temporarily was that the FX reserves also include securities 
that were purchased at a price higher than their nominal value at a higher interest rate. It follows 
that higher interest income in the past is coupled with losses at future maturities; thus, overall, 
this process postpones the impact of market interest rate developments on the P&L. 
The losses incurred by the MNB affect the fiscal balance only if retained earnings fail to cover the central 
bank’s current year losses. Owing to its earlier profitable operation, the central bank has accumulated 
profit reserves, which has enabled it to finance the losses that it has incurred so far. Even the losses 
incurred in 2012 are likely to be covered from the reserves. Accordingly, the fiscal balance is expected 
to be first affected in 2014 only (by the losses in 2013, which are likely to amount to 0.6 percentage 
point of GDP). 
Nevertheless, there are numerous risks surrounding the forecast for central bank P&L. If the exchange 
rate path and the interest rate path, the two factors that affect P&L the most, fail to fall in line with our 
expectations, then the losses incurred by the MNB may also depart from the levels we have projected. 
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6 FACTORS EXPLAINING THE PRODUCTIVITY SHORTFALL 
Assessments of productivity in the private sector have become increasingly uncertain over recent 
quarters. Based on data indicative for the whole economy, there has recently been a significant 
deterioration in productivity. As wages in the private sector have so far been unable to counterbalance 
this deterioration (as a result, in part, of administrative wage raises), unit labour costs have risen 
materially in the sector. 
This uncertainty is reflected by the different labour statistics17 painting a sharply contradicting picture of 
private sector employment in the recent past. We pointed out this phenomenon in the September 
Report, but could not provide a sound economic explanation at the time, though. Now we seek to offer 
such explanation, drawing up a list of the consequences that the possible explanations may have in 
respect of our forecast. 
6.1.1 THE DIAGNOSIS 
Private sector productivity is the ratio of the value added generated by the sector and the amount of 
labour used for this purpose. The employment figures disclosed in both the institutional survey (IS) and 
the labour force survey (LFS) can be used to measure labour input. The two statistics have shown an 
increasingly conflicting picture of private sector productivity since last year (Chart 6-1). 
 
Chart 6-1 Private sector productivity according to different labour statistics 
seasonally adjusted quarterly data 
  
As the IS data show co-movement with the deterioration in the sector’s output more closely, productivity 
calculated on the basis of IS conforms to the modest growth experienced subsequent to the recovery 
(2012 Q3). By contrast, the LFS figures suggest a continuous rise in employment since 2011; as a result, 
productivity has been steadily deteriorating since then, running counter to trends during the recovery. 
                                                 
17 The Central Statistical Office (CSO) publishes two types of statistics for the purpose of measuring employment. One is an 
individual questionnaire-based labour survey (LFS) and the other is institutional statistics based on data reported by companies and 
budgetary institutions (IS). IS private sector data, contrary to similar LFS statistics, do not include, among other things, data on 
persons working fewer than 60 hours per month, micro enterprises, the non-profit sector and those working in the informal 
economy. The two types of statistics usually coincide in respect of developments in private sector employment; over shorter 
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The September Report already tackled the issue of the factors that may underlie the expansion in private 
sector employment suggested by the LFS. At the time, we were of the opinion that the widening gap 
between employment data was limited to the services sector; however, we could not identify any deeper 
interconnections on the basis of the data available to us then. 
 
Chart 6-2 Private sector employment by company size 
seasonally adjusted quarterly LFS data 
 
 
Based on the individual data received since then, we have found a marked discrepancy between the 
behaviour of micro-enterprises18 and that of corporations larger in size. The numbers employed in the 
private sector fell considerably (by a total of 150,000) in the first years of the crisis. By contrast, 
employment has risen by about 75,000 in the micro-enterprise segment since the peak of the crisis, thus 
approximating pre-crisis levels by mid-2012. There has been no marked shift in the staffing levels of 
large corporations from the levels seen at the trough of the crisis (Chart 6-2). 
Companies employing fewer than 10 persons account for close to 40 per cent of private sector 
employment, but only slightly over 10 per cent of the sector’s value added. There has been a shift in 
sector employment towards small companies in the past quarters, which has exerted a negative 
composition effect on productivity indicators measured over the entire sector.  
6.1.2 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
Several explanations can be offered for the deterioration in productivity stemming from an increase in 
employment in the segment of small enterprises. In terms of the possible consequences, there are three 
major groups: statistical measurement problems, temporary shocks and the consequences of a structural 
transition of the Hungarian economy. The deterioration in productivity may be due to a statistical 
measurement problem, in which case it leaves the operation of the economy unaffected and disappears 
                                                 
18 Our studies prove that the upper limit for the size of micro-enterprises should be 10 employees, because it is the very limit 
where corporate behaviour starts to become distinctly different.  Considering the fact that the IS sample also includes companies 
employing at least 5 persons, the question arises why there has been no similar rise in the 5 to 10 employment category also 
included in the IS. This is likely to be the outcome of the fact that the IS does not include those employed in the informal economy. 
As black market employment is common among micro-enterprises, it cannot be ruled out that even companies actually larger than 
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over time with no consequences whatsoever. If, however, the deterioration in productivity is attributable 
to temporary shocks, adjustment should materialise already in the short term. This may result in a 
significant fall in private sector employment up to the point where the loss of profit arising from a 
deterioration in productivity is recouped. Finally, the deterioration in productivity may be due to a 
permanent restructuring of the economy towards a more labour-intensive production structure with 
lower labour productivity. In the latter case, adjustments warranted by temporary shocks are likely to be 
much more restrained in the real and nominal processes, as productivity and profitability are only 
partially restored in the corporate sector in this scenario.  
6.1.3 MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS 
What renders the understanding of the marked deterioration in productivity difficult is that its root 
causes are linked to a corporate segment (micro-enterprises) on which only few data are available and 
even the available data are surrounded with relatively large measurement-related uncertainty. 
Furthermore, it is this segment where the percentage of underground economic employment and grey or 
black economic activity is higher, which also compromises data quality. It may also be the case that 
estimates for the value added generated by micro-enterprises do not measure actual demand for 
businesses properly. 
An explanation is offered by a statistical recording difference between the two employment statistics. 
Institutional statistics record the non-profit sector separately. A similar distinction is not possible in the 
labour survey. As a result, the Labour Force Survey includes those employed by non-profit companies 
providing other than public administrative, educational or human healthcare services in the private 
sector. IS statistics for non-profit companies have been tracking trends in public work employment 
closely since 2009, suggesting that some of those employed in the public work programmes are employed 
via non-profit companies. A comparison of IS employment data also including data for non-profit 
companies with LFS data for private sector employment may offer an explanation for nearly half of the 
difference meaning 70,000 persons that has materialised in 2012, though even this adjustment fails to 
offer an explanation for the significant rise in employment seen before 2012 (Chart 6-3). 
Chart 6-3 Private sector productivity based on employment statistics 
 
It also cannot be ruled out, that small companies have a better financial situation in fact, than what one 
can observe in aggregate data. Certain changes in taxation (e.g. the reduction in corporate taxes) in 
force since 2010 may have improved the after-tax profits of smaller companies via the easing of 
corporate burdens, which, in turn, is likely to have been used to fund the expansion in employment. On 
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administrative wage increases19 raised the relative employment costs of low-income earners in the same 
period, which made employment more expensive for small businesses, because they typically employ 
these individuals. However the net effect of these tax legislations could improve permanently the 
financial situation of smaller companies. 
Other, directly unobserved funds also include EU funds. Based on the data provided by the National 
Development Agency, the amount of EU funds awarded expressly to micro-enterprises under the 
economic development operational programme has nearly doubled, while the number of the companies 
concerned has grown over 3.5-fold. The sum of all the awarded operative programmes increased HUF 
103,7 billions by this year from 49,7 billion forints in 2010. The current European budget cycle will end in 
2013. However further payments are expected to boom till than, the positive employment effect of 
these sources could be only temporary. 
6.1.4 Signs of temporary shocks  
In order to perform a more in-depth analysis of trends in productivity, we used the decomposition below, 
which can be performed separately for companies with less than 10 employees and larger companies, 
due to the composition changes: 
 
    
 
   
                 
 
where   denotes the sector’s value added,20   is the number of employees,   is working hours per capita 
and ∆ denotes annual change. Accordingly,     denotes the labour used in the sector. Using the number 
of working hours enables us to examine both extensive limits to corporate adjustment (i.e. changes in 
employment) and adjustments through changes in employment intensity.  
Based on the above, it can be observed that trends in corporate productivity suggest larger swings 
(higher volatility) and slower adjustment for them (greater persistence). This is attributable to 
fluctuations in the value added of larger corporations to which these companies respond only moderately 
in terms of labour used. Another phenomenon regarding adjustment is that companies respond almost 
immediately at the intensive threshold (e.g. by reducing the number of working hours through the 
reclassification of staff into the part-time category when demand is weaker); by contrast, adjustment 
occurs with even a 2- to 3-quarter lag at the extensive threshold, when demand is persistently weaker. 
Contrary to micro-enterprises, larger companies usually have such reserves that enable them to protect 
their existing labour force, i.e. in effect, their accumulated company-specific human capital, over 
shorter terms. This can be reasonable, because the reproduction of this type of capital may, in some 
cases, prove to be more expensive than the short-term financial losses stemming from labour-hoarding 
(Chart 6-4). 
 
                                                 
19
However the government implemented the instrument of wagecompensation in order to offset the cost raising effects of the 
legislations of labour-taxes in 2012, it conditioned this instrument on an expected wage increasing scheme, which should have 
covered by employers up to 5 per cent. This condition increased the labourcosts of low income earner employees for even those 
who participated the wage-compensation programme. 
 
20 For the decomposition of the value added of the two company groups only yearly data are available in 
the micro-database of the tax authority.  In order to generate quarterly data, we decomposed the yearly 
value added date in such a way that ratio of the VAs in the two groups equals the yearly averages 
observed in the database of the tax authority. 
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Chart 6-4 Decomposition of private sector productivity by corporate size 
(seasonally adjusted quarterly LS and tax authority data and MNB estimates) 
 
Note: The contribution of employment and that of working hours to productivity carry opposite 
signs, i.e. an increase in working hours leads to a deterioration in productivity.  
There are more moderate swings and less persistence in the productivity of micro-companies. This may 
be due to the fact that although the size of the shocks to value added is similar to that of the shocks 
affecting larger companies, employment-related responses are stronger in the micro-segment. Some 
authors like Brock and Evans (1989) or Cravo (2011) showed that the response to temporary shocks of 
small companies (especially in emerging markets) is way more elastic than larger ones.  
As, in many cases, labour shedding in the micro-segment is synonymous with the discontinuation of 
business operation; neither intensive adjustment nor labour-hoarding is common among micro-
enterprises. The number of the working hours per capita has been decreasing almost consistently over 
the past seven years irrespective of short-term developments in the business cycle, thus improving 
productivity. 
In recent quarters, productivity has deteriorated recently mainly in the segment of businesses employing 
fewer than 10 persons, to which increase in employment in this segment has been the main contributing 
factor. As this has been only partly offset by shorter working hours per capita, productivity measured by 
total hours worked has continued to deteriorate in the past nearly one year. 
Quarters preceding the slowdown of 2012 were characterised by promising growth expectations, which 
may provided a basis to the employment raisings. The relapse of external demand may contributed to 
the deterioration of productivity, to which companies were able to adjust with delays. If, however, 
temporary shocks also play a part in the deterioration of productivity, corporations are likely to make 
significant layoffs already in the short run, once such shocks have worn off. 
This can be confirmed by the fact, that micro enterprises because of their small size are attached to 
external markets through larger companies, hence negative demand shocks that hit these bigger firms 
exert their effect on small companies with a delay.. Such a lag may be even longer as there is also a 
delay in corporations’ employment response relative to developments in their value added.  
The above explanation is somewhat challenged by the fact that, although the deterioration in 
productivity used to be the result of reduction in value added, it was triggered by higher employment in 
mid-2011; by contrast, demand is likely to have started to decline early this year. 
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In response to the strong shocks in to the macroeconomy recent years, some permanent changes are also 
likely to have occurred in the structure of Hungary’s economy. Such permanent changes may easily have 
affected corporate behaviour as well, which, therefore, historical patterns cannot fully explain. 
The fact that corporations have been faced with a weak supply of capital for a long time now points to a 
permanent change in economic trends. As a result, the investment rate has also been historically low 
recently. These findings point to a rise in the relative price of capital input. The latter process may have 
been enhanced by the extra tax levied on the financial sector, which may made the external fundraising 
of companies more expensive. 
There are also signs of permanent changes in the labour market as well. There has been a continuous 
increase in labour supply over the past two years. We expect that this increase was due to factors whose 
impact will persist in the near future as well. As, in keeping with disappointing data on job creation, this 
significant labour supply pressure has not met corresponding labour demand since the onset of the crisis, 
unemployment has reached historically high levels. As an outcome of this supply pressure and poor 
demand, private sector wages have been lagging permanently behind their pre-crisis levels, while a 
decrease in real wages was seen in more than one year. The administrative measures that have entered 
into force this year have hindered labour price adjustments in the short run. The effects restraining wage 
increases are highly likely to persist in the years to come as well (Chart 6-5). 
Chart 6-5 Evolution of the price of capital relative to labour 
 
Note: Price of capital is measured by theinterests of loans to non-financial corporations with 1-5 
years maturity, the price of labour is measured by the labour-cost index. Source: Eurostat.  
The above effects lead to the likely conclusion that the price of labour relative to capital, has dropped 
significantly, which can be verified by data21.That may urge corporations to use more labour intensive 
technologies, i.e. to substitute capital for labour in production. Such technological transformation may 
entail a permanent deterioration in labour productivity. 
6.1.6 Conclusions 
Trends in productivity can be assessed only with a large degree of uncertainty under the current 
circumstances. Uncertainty is caused by a rise in employment in the segment of micro-enterprises. Such 
a rise is not justified by the weak business cycle. A number of explanations can be offered for this, with 
each explanation leading to a different conclusion. Our analysis confirms that each possible scenario can 
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offer only a partial explanation for the productivity dilemma; the likely underlying reason for 
deterioration in productivity is a combined effect. 
Overall, both permanent and temporary processes are likely to have contributed to a shift in private 
sector employment and productivity over the past quarters. In light of this, in order to restore their 
productivity, companies are likely to curb employment in the short run and put a brake on the dynamics 
of wage increases in the long run. As the price of labour relative to that of capital has declined 
consistently over the past years, in restoring productivity, corporations are likely to restore it at levels 
that are lower than they used to be. 
Table 6-1 Possible explanations and consequences of the productivity-puzzle  
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by non-profit companies
The public work program is the benchmark to the gap between the to 
labour-statistics: in case of a further expanding PWP an additional 
Better cash-flow of 
companies because of 
tax legislation or EU-
As these sources run out, employment financed by these will be layed off.
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7 TECHNICAL ANNEX: DECOMPOSITION OF THE 2012 AND 2013 
AVERAGE INFLATION  
 
Table 7-1 Decomposition of the inflation to overlapping and incoming effect (2012-2013) 
  
* The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of 
the so called overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by 
the preceding year's price changes, while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these 
indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect 
taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been 
calculated using the technical effect of the VAT hike. 
Table 7-2 Detailed decomposition of our inflation forecast to overlapping and incoming effects  
 
  
* The tables show the decomposition of the yearly average change of the consumer price index. The yearly change is the sum of 
the so called overlapping and incoming effects. The overlapping effect is the part of the yearly index, which can be explained by 
the preceding year's price changes, while the incoming effect reflects the changes in the recent year. We decomposed these 
indices to the sub-aggregates of the consumer price index; and we calculated inflationary effects of the changes in the indirect 
taxes, the administered prices, and market prices (not administered prices excluding indirect tax effects). The figures have been 












Market prices 0,7 1,9 2,6




CPI 1,4 4,3 5,7









Market prices 0,5 2,1 2,6




CPI 0,9 2,5 3,5














Food -0,4 0,1 4,9 1,2 5,9
   non-processed -3,3 0,0 8,7 1,6 6,9
   processed 1,2 0,2 2,9 1,0 5,4
Traded goods 0,9 0,2 0,2 1,3 2,6
   durables -0,3 0,0 -1,7 0,8 -1,2
   non-durables 1,2 0,2 1,1 1,5 4,1
Market services 1,0 0,0 1,7 1,8 4,5
Market energy 3,0 0,0 5,2 1,6 10,1
Alcohol and 
Tobacco
0,2 2,8 2,2 7,2 12,8
Fuel 5,2 1,2 4,1 1,6 12,7
Administered prices 0,6 0,7 2,1 1,2 4,7
Consumer Price 
Index
0,8 0,5 2,3 1,9 5,7















Food 2,0 0,0 4,2 0,0 6,3
   non-processed 2,2 0,0 3,5 0,0 5,8
   processed 1,9 0,0 4,6 0,0 6,5
Traded goods 0,3 0,0 1,3 0,0 1,6
   durables -0,8 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,7
   non-durables 0,7 0,0 1,3 0,0 2,0
Market services 0,8 0,3 2,7 2,3 6,2
Market energy 3,1 0,0 -0,3 0,0 2,7
Alcohol and 
Tobacco
2,4 2,3 2,0 3,6 10,7
Fuel -4,4 0,0 4,4 0,0 -0,3
Administered prices 0,5 0,1 -1,7 0,0 -1,1
Consumer Price 
Index
0,6 0,3 1,7 0,8 3,5
Core inflation 1,0 0,4 2,4 1,2 5,2
2013
